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In January 1850, members of the Democratic Society of Cali, a provincial capital in
southern Colombia, paraded through the streets to the tune of the Marseillaise.1 The society
marched in support of the liberal government that had taken power the previous year, which had
awoken the wrath of the conservative oligarchs. The men of the society, from poor, plebeian
backgrounds, did not see their struggle as simply a footnote in the larger history of transatlantic
revolution. Rather, they represented another generation of patriots, marching in defense of their
patria to another Valmy.2 In the decades after the wars of independence, amidst the revolutions

1

James E Sanders, The Vanguard of the Atlantic World: Creating Modernity, Nation, and Democracy in Nineteenthcentury Latin America (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 154.
2
Valmy was one of the first battles of the French Revolutionary Wars, during which the Marseillaise made its debut
on the world stage.
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and civil wars, Colombia’s artisans and peasants came to claim the Marseillaise, and the
revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity that it represented, as their own. Carrying
forward their own red, blue, and yellow tricolor, Cali’s plebeians, in rallying to defense of their
nation, were fundamentally reshaping it.3 However, they were not doing so in isolation. Ramón
Mercado, the provincial governor and a passionate revolutionary, played a leading role in
organizing the province’s poor masses, promising them social and political liberty in exchange
for their support for the liberal cause. This bargain, struck between plebeians and a middle-class
lawyer, provided not just the impetus that drove the Democratic Society onto the streets in
January 1850, but also the foundation for the Colombian nation.
Colombians were not alone in their efforts to reshape the post-independence Latin
American nation. By 1850 Mexican and Venezuelan plebeians were also engaged in social and
political struggles to win autonomy and freedom from both aristocratic hacendados and
conservative dictators. Just as Colombia’s plebeians found political strength and influence
through an alliance with the radical lawyer Ramón Mercado, in Venezuela the provincial
merchant Ezequiel Zamora played a leading role in the revolt of the landless workers and
peasants of the southern plains, while in Mexico the liberal general Juan Álvarez led the
indigenous communities of Guerrero against both foreign invasion and the centralist state. Each
of these men, rather than filling the role of the stereotypical “caudillo,” relied for support not on
patron-client networks or charisma alone, but on his ability to articulate the rural poor’s demands
for inclusion as ciudadanos of the nation. Mercado and Álvarez went even further, incorporating
not just plebeians’ political demands into their programs, but their social demands as well:

3

Throughout this study, the word plebeian is used to refer to the mass of artisans, peasants, smallholders, farmworkers, and wage laborers who made up the rural poor in each country. This term has been selected to emphasize
the heterogenous class structure of the movements alongside their association with the common people.
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calling for an end to the oligarchy’s oppression of peasants and workers. Zamora, Mercado, and
Álvarez all thus played a vital role as mediators, using their positions in national liberal parties to
bring the rhetoric and practice of plebeian nationalism onto the national stage, where it
fundamentally reshaped almost every aspect of postcolonial Latin American society.
In order to analyze the political and social impact of each of these mediators, this study
begins with a brief survey of recent scholarship of post-independence Latin America, contrasting
the prevailing view that the region was dominated by caudillos with new studies that have
highlighted the ideological and social bases of post-independence conflict. This historiographical
survey is followed by an analysis of the effects of the Wars of Independence on the political
consciousness of Latin American plebeians. I also explore the intellectual roots of Latin
American liberalism and the beginning of state formation. Following this exploration, the study
will turn to Ezequiel Zamora, and his efforts to raise rural peasants and artisans in revolt against
the Venezuelan government in 1846, emphasizing the importance of the discourse of citizenship
in post-colonial Latin America. From Venezuela I will proceed to Ramón Mercado’s efforts to
build the Democratic Society of Cali and the heightening tensions between liberals and
conservatives that ultimately exploded into civil war in 1851. The study of Mercado will focus
particularly on the relationships between nationalist rhetoric, political democracy, and social
revolution. Finally, the paper will conclude with the struggle of Juan Álvarez and the peasants of
southern Mexico in defense of the federal system. In particular, the case study will deal with the
centrality of demands for local autonomy in liberal nationalist programs, and their ramifications
on both La Reforma and the future development of the Mexican state and nation.
A brief note on terminology—until 1863, the modern nation of Colombia was known as
New Granada (Nueva Granada) and Colombians referred to themselves as “Granadans”
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(Granadinos). For the sake of simplicity, this paper will use the modern terminology, however
various quotations may use the historic terms.
A note on translation—except in the cases of those documents deriving from The Mexico
Reader, The Bolívarian Revolution. and Latin American Independence: An Anthology of Sources,
all translations of primary sources were made by the author. My deepest gratitude goes to Javier
Raúl García de Alarcon for his advice at various stages of the translation process. Ultimately,
however, all translations are my own responsibility.
Changing Perspectives on the 19th Century
For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, narratives of the conflicts and struggles that
marked mid-19th century Latin America focused on the “caudillos.” The caudillo, seen by the
historian as the heir to the multitude of fractious generals in the independence wars, fought out of
greed and a personal desire for power. As Peter Guardino notes, the shadow of Antonio López de
Santa Anna has been particularly long, his political opportunism and ambition providing the
archetypal caudillo both for contemporaries and later historians.4 Guillermo Morón, in his history
of Venezuela, provides another example of the traditional caudillo narrative. Antonio Guzmán
Blanco, a contemporary liberal leader states that “…Venezuelans… don’t even know what
[federation] means. The idea of federation came from me and some others… ‘since every
revolution has to have a slogan…for if our opponents… had said federation, we should have said
centralism!’”5

4

Peter Guardino, The Dead March: A History of the Mexican-American War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2017), 17.
5

Guillermo Morón, A History of Venezuela (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1964), 168.
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Besides reinforcing the traditional image of the ambitious caudillo, the preceding
quotation reveals another aspect of the caudillo narrative – the unthinking masses. The plebeian
peasants, artisans, and laborers that formed the armies led by these caudillos have no agency, and
no demands of their own. In Guzmán Blanco’s view, they cannot even understand what they are
fighting for! Deprived of any ideological or mass dimensions, the civil conflicts of Latin
America are seen largely as various leaders fighting for personal power. This being the case,
Latin America in this period was assigned by historians a largely parochial role in the greater
scheme of world history. As James Sanders has pointed out, in Eric Hobsbawm’s world map of
republicanism in 1847, South America is obscured by an inset of Europe.6 Historians have
generally not thought it possible that events like the Federal War in Venezuela or the Colombian
Civil War of 1851 could compare to such watershed moments as the US Civil War or the
Revolutions of 1848.
While the traditional caudillo narrative is not as dominant today as it was in the preceding
century, aspects of it live on in the pessimistic take of some scholars on Latin American nationstates. In Blood and Debt, Miguel Angel Centeno applied the bellicist model of state formation
to Latin America, to prove that the European experience, in terms of the development of
coherent nation states, is the historical exception. Inherent to this argument is the assumption that
the Latin American experience demonstrates that “the formation of nation-states is not
inevitable.”7 According to Centeno, conflicts in Latin America, rather than building the nation,
tore it apart. For example, the great ideological civil wars of Colombian history, rather than
creating stronger nations or states, “became so institutionalized that competition between parties

6

Sanders, The Vanguard of the Atlantic World, 10.
Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-state in Latin America (University Park (PA):
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 275.
7

Riley 8

and their adherents became more important than the original points of dispute.”8 Again, political
conflict in 19th century Latin America is seen through a factionalist rather than ideological light.
Further, Centeno contends that due to ethnic and regionalist divisions, conflicts in 19th century
Latin America were characterized by groups opting out of, rather than into, the nation.9 The
faction and caste ridden Latin America of the 19th, and even 20th centuries, could not produce
nations.
The methodology Centeno uses to arrive at the above conclusions is somewhat flawed,
however. Despite Centeno’s argument being that the Latin American experience of nation-state
formation proves the European to be the exception rather than the rule, his conclusions about the
nation in Latin America are based upon his application of the European derived bellicist model
to Latin America. Demonstrative of this contradiction, in his effort to determine the strength of
Latin American nationalist myths, Centeno analyzes the stamps, street names, and statues of
Latin American countries for military nationalist themes, even though, as Centeno himself often
notes, interstate war is comparatively rare in Latin America.10 Concluding that wars, particularly
interstate wars, did not in Latin America create the same impulse towards nationhood as they did
in Europe, Centeno largely does not contemplate whether Latin America ever produced any
original mode of nation-building.
Recently, Latin America’s supposed lack of popular politics has been challenged by the
application of subaltern studies to Latin America. These national histories focus on the role that
plebeians played in 19th politics, and their contributions to national development. One of the first
such studies was Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico’s National State by Peter

8

Ibid., 63.
Ibid., 150.
10
Ibid., 183-194.
9
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Guardino. Guardino chronicles the struggle of mulatto sharecroppers and indigenous peasants in
Guerrero throughout the independence and early republican eras, alongside elite figures like Juan
Álvarez, for citizenship and autonomy.11 Rather than seeing the 19th century as solely defined by
struggles between elites, Guardino focuses on how elite and plebian politics were intertwined.
Indeed, such monumental changes as independence and the formation of a new national state
would have deep impacts on plebeians, and plebeians would formulate their own responses.12
These responses would have a deep impact on the development of the Mexican state,
demonstrating to the Mexican elite that “even an authoritarian state had to be inclusive.”13 The
supposedly ignorant plebian classes, rather than being marginal to 19th century politics, were
integral to them.
Aside from the impact of plebian politics, Guardino makes several interesting
observations about their form. Popular liberalism and federalism persisted, despite an oftenhostile central government, because they were strongest at the periphery of the state.14 Distance
from the centers of elite power gave plebeians a greater space within which to organize and
develop their own political programs and organizations. Guardino also notes how, while
plebeians were major political actors, the inability of any one social group to obtain complete
hegemony ensured that popular liberalism and rural politics would be characterized by crossclass coalitions.15 Plebeians provided sympathetic local elites, like Juan Álvarez, with the

11

Peter F. Guardino, Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexicos National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857,
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 217.
12
Ibid., 212.
13
Ibid., 219.
14
Ibid., 218.
15
Ibid., 214-215.
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manpower and support necessary to compete in national political struggle, while elites could
offer plebeians the incorporation of some of their demands into programs and policies.
Similar themes emerge out of James Sanders’s history of 19th century Colombia,
Contentious Republicans. Sanders’s book explores his theory that politics in Colombia were
defined by “republican bargaining” between elites and plebeians. Beginning with the election of
1848, the Colombian Liberal Party increasingly began to make direct appeals to the rural poor,
promising not only vague ideals like equality, but also concrete policies, such as the abolition of
slavery, the end of monopolies, and even the protection of peasant common lands, the ejidos.16
The alliance forged by bargaining became vital to the Liberal Party’s fortunes, as the military
and political support of plebeians would be decisive to their victories in the civil wars that
dominated the country from the mid to late 19th centuries.17 Bargaining, then, not only ensured
the incorporation of plebeians, and their demands, into Colombia’s national political arena, it
also formed the basis of a multiclass liberal movement strong enough to fend off repeated
conservative challenges.
The basic unit of republican bargaining was the Democratic Society, a series of political
clubs set up by liberals around the country during the election of 1848. These clubs were open to
all men, and thus provided a space where elite and middling liberals could converse and develop
a common program with their plebeian counterparts.18 These clubs also provided largely
unrepresented and illiterate Afro-Colombian peasants and artisans the chance to advocate their
own fiery brand of popular liberalism, which called for the social and political equality of all

16

James E Sanders, Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-century Colombia
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 70.
17
Ibid., 59.
18
Ibid., 66-69.
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under an inclusive banner of citizenship.19 Similar to what Guardino observed in Guerrero, interclass alliances and plebian political organization allowed plebeians to play a vital and
independent role in Colombian politics.
Subaltern studies’ methodologies have also been applied to countries that usually receive
little attention in broader surveys. In Ambitious Rebels, Reuben Zahler describes the profound
changes in Venezuelan society throughout the late colonial and early republican periods.
Particularly, Zahler notes how, amid an economic crisis in the 1840s, the Venezuelan Liberal
Party for the first time designed a platform aimed at winning mass support. The result of this
was, that, when the Conservative Party committed election fraud in 1846, plebeian classes
“rebelled to support ‘their’ party.”20 In Venezuela as well, multiclass coalitions were an integral
aspect of politics. Rural liberal elites, such as Ezequiel Zamora, led the plebeians during the
rebellion.21 In Venezuela, just as in Mexico and Colombia, the need of liberal elites for political
support combined with plebeians’ political aspirations ensured that politics would develop a
popular character.
The subaltern studies have constituted a significant reevaluation of 19th century politics in
Latin America. Rather than viewing the plebeian masses of Latin American counties as ignorant
of, or uninterested in, politics, they highlight the significant contributions plebeians made to the
developments of states and ideologies. They replace the image of the military caudillo, who
relies on patronage and conscription to gain support, with that of the liberal lawyer, party
official, or local notable, who promises reform and new rights in return for plebeian support.

19

Ibid., 47.
Reuben Zahler, Ambitious Rebels: Remaking Honor, Law, and Liberalism in Venezuela, 1780-1850 (Tucson,
Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 2013), 224-225.
21
Ibid., 225.
20
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Latin American politics in the 19th century can now safely be said to have been characterized by
plebian assertiveness and multi-class coalitions, rather than pure caudillismo and elite struggles.
Through these discoveries, they have revealed the importance of analyzing more closely political
developments at the margins of nations, both in a geographical and social sense.
At the same time, one drawback of the subaltern studies approach in Latin America is
that it has focused far more on the state than on the nation. While outlining in great detail the
contributions of plebeians to the state, they have had less to say on how plebeians may have had
an influence on the development of nationhood in their respective countries. While Sanders does
note that plebeians’ participation in democratizing projects resulted in a greater feeling of
nationhood among them, the primary focus is on that democratizing effort, rather than the
national project.22 The exact process of how plebeians and liberal elites could together construct
nations out of the caste ridden colonial order remains to be examined.
The subaltern studies have, however, helped form the basis of a new line of transnational
histories that challenge the supposed marginality of Latin America. This new scholarship is
exemplified by James Sanders’s The Vanguard of the Atlantic World, which describes how Latin
Americans saw themselves as at the center of world progress. While a great deal of previous
scholarship has been based on the writing and ideas of letrado elites, Sanders points out that
when the historian begins to focus on “everyday political thought and discourse,” our image of
19th century Latin America changes significantly. Rather than the story being one of exasperated
elites complaining of how poorly their countries compared to “European civilization,” it is one of
an active plebeian political culture, where artisans and peasants gathered in taverns to hear the

22
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latest news and speeches.23 Not only did Latin American’s not see themselves as inferior to
Europe, they redefined the basis of modernity itself. Sanders describes this unique conception of
modernity as American Republican Modernity, which contended that political inclusion and
social progress, rather than industrial capitalism, were the core of modernity. This view of
modernity placed the Americas at the core, and Europe as “…desperately reacting to the events
in…the Americas.”24
In Vanguard, Sanders also makes an interesting observation about the relationship
between nations and states in Latin America. While traditional European derived theory argues
that the state is the maker of nation and nationalism, in Latin America, notions of nationhood
developed independently of, and became more powerful than, the state. It was plebeians, rather
than elites that were most influential in the development of the nation.25 Ultimately, this populist
notion of the nation collapsed because of elites’ efforts to strengthen the state and reestablish the
social order. The Latin American nation, by promoting an active, assertive, and unruly plebeian
class, was not a base upon which modern capitalism could develop. As such, in Mexico through
the Porfiriato, and in Colombia through the Regeneración, elites strengthened the state so that it
could discipline plebeians, all at the expense of the nation.26 Modern capitalism and the powerful
states that accompanied it ultimately destroyed the democratic, plebeian conception of
nationhood.
One of the most recent (and perhaps unique) additions to the historiography of 19th
century Latin America is Michel Gobat’s Empire by Invitation, about the William Walker

23
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24

Riley 14

expedition in Nicaragua. Despite the traditional narrative of the conflict being one of the
villainous yanqui imperialist and the helpless Nicaraguan victim, Gobat illustrates how Walker’s
project to construct a Jeffersonian “Empire of Liberty” in Nicaragua had significant local
support. This support came particularly from Nicaragua’s plebeian classes, and from peasant
radicals such as José María Valle, who urged Walker to emancipate the local poor from the
power of the aristocracy.27 Walker’s surprising local support was seen across Central America,
where the military response of both El Salvador and Guatemala’s governments was slowed by
the support of each countries liberal party for Walker. Even during the war, “pro-Walker slogans
mysteriously appeared on the walls of several Guatemalan towns.”28 Gobat’s research helps
reveal that, while events like the Walker expedition have been used to argue that Latin American
was simply the plaything of imperial powers, in reality, it had its own agency. Walker’s
enterprise relied on the support of the Central American masses, and when it lost that support, it
collapsed.29
The last few years have thus seen a significant reevaluation of 19th century Latin
America’s place in the greater world. It is increasingly becoming clear that contrary to the ideas
of writers like Centeno, 19th century Latin America had strong and vital nations, constructed not
by the state or war, but by the democratizing force of insurgent plebeians. However, while this
fact has been recognized, the origins and processes that underlie it have not yet been studied in
their full depth. That the nation existed there is no doubt, but how the nationalism that forged it
was able to capture the minds of so many plebeians without state-backing must still be

27

Michel Gobat, Empire by Invitation William Walker and Manifest Destiny in Central America (Cambridge:
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28
Ibid., 254.
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Ibid., 284-285.
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addressed. Indeed, how plebeians, who had for generations been subjected to an ethnic and social
caste system, became the vanguard of national movements is a vastly important question not just
for the study of Latin America, but for the study of nationalism in general. This paper addresses
the question of plebeian nationalism by following the example of the subaltern studies’
methodology, through looking at the nation-building efforts of radical liberals, both plebeian and
elite, which thrived at the margins of the state.
From Independence to Statehood
Early republican Latin America was shaped by the intersection between its unique
situation and the general trends of the Age of Revolution. The French Revolution in particular
had a deep impact on the independence movements. As early as 1794 in New Granada, the
patriotic Bogotano Antonio Nariño awoke the ire of Spanish authorities by translating The
Declaration of the Rights of Man into Spanish. Not long after, an independence-minded
conspiracy in Venezuela produced a “Canción Americana,” with lyrics that referred to “the
sovereign people,” a clear reference to the French Revolution’s peuple souverain.30 In Mexico,
José María Morelos’s “Sentiments of the Nation” also incorporated references to the sovereign
people.31 While in France the revolutionary and Rousseauian ideology of the Jacobins was forced
underground by Thermidor and Brumaire, it would find a new space within which to grow in
Latin America.
One of the most influential ideas to take root in Latin America was that of the citizen.
Similar to revolutionary France, revolutionary Latin America had a strong culture of patriotic

30

Sarah C. Chambers, and John Charles Chasteen, Latin American Independence: An Anthology of Sources
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2010), 58-59.
31
Gilbert M. Joseph, and Timothy J. Henderson. The Mexico Reader History, Culture, Politics (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2006), 189-190.
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citizenship. Simón Bolívar exemplifies this culture with his 1819 remarks to the Congress of
Angostura that he preferred the title of “good citizen… to that of liberator, bestowed… by
Venezuela, to that of perfecter bestowed by Cundinamarca, and to all others the universe could
confer.”32 Bolívar highlights how, for the republican, the title of citizen should be their greatest
aspiration, rather than military glory, as represented by “liberator,” or political power, as
represented by “perfecter.” Just as in France, the idea that society ought to be composed of
coequal citizens was influential in Latin America’s revolutions.
However, while Latin American revolutionaries may have adopted many of the ideas of
the French revolution, it is vital to note that this was not mere imitation. Ideas like citizenship, to
be made truly applicable in a Latin American context very different from that of Europe, had to
be rethought. As John Chasteen notes, the concept of citizenship was broader in Latin America
than it was in the United States or Europe, as it embraced not only the creole population, but also
those of African, indigenous, and mixed descent.33 While these ideals were often not realized in
practice, the fact that from the beginning, citizenship was theoretically open to all, fundamentally
altered the nature of what it meant to be a citizen in Latin America. The ciudadanos of the Latin
American republics were unique participants and products of the Age of Revolution, just as were
the citizens of the United States, and the citoyens of France and Haiti.
The Latin American notion of citizenship was fundamentally shaped by the exigencies of
the wars of independence. In his 1816 Decree for the Emancipation of the Slaves, Simón Bolívar
declared that “…the slaves who have groaned under the Spanish yoke during the three previous
centuries” were now citizens. Interestingly, Bolívar identifies the social injustice of slavery

32

Simón Bolívar, and Hugo Chávez Frías, The Bolívarian Revolution (London: Verso, 2009), 79.
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entirely with the enemy of independence, Spain. At the same time, Bolívar also declared that
since “the Republic needs the service of all her children,” only those slaves who joined the
patriot army would be free. By joining the army, slaves, along with their families became
ciudadanos. However, if they failed to do so, they remained in servitude.34 Bolívar, in need of
military support to continue his campaign, broke down racial and economic barriers to
citizenship by declaring that even a recently freed slave could be a ciudadano. At the same time,
he erected a new qualification – only the man who was willing to take up arms in defense of his
patria could truly be a ciudadano. It was patriotism that distinguished the ciudadano from the
subject. Bolívar’s decree thus is an early example of an elite bargaining with plebeians, offering
them a chance to achieve legal equality, but only in return for their patriotic commitment to the
national cause.
Similar rhetoric appears in Bolívar’s 1820 Decree on Indian Labor. Given less than a
year after the liberation of Colombia at the battle of Boyacá, the decree sought to end the
extraction of unpaid labor from indigenous peoples. However, most interesting is Bolívar’s order
that local officials inform indigenous peoples of the decree directly, and to urge them to “…
demand their rights even though it be against the judges themselves…”35 Amidst his efforts to
establish a new administration in recently liberated territory, Bolívar encourages plebeians to
challenge the authority of local officials perceived as violating their rights. In so doing, he
attempted to demonstrate to plebeians that their new status and rights as ciudadanos had concrete
benefits for them, as they now were able to challenge the power of colonial institutions that had
long oppressed them. The decree also invokes a highly egalitarian spirit, asserting that even poor

34
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indigenous peoples now had the right to challenge the unjust actions of the powerful, like judges.
Some liberal letrados explicitly encouraged plebeians to think of themselves as rights-bearing
citizens entitled to autonomy and dignity.
The speeches of letrados like Bolívar, however, do not represent the actual extent of
political and social change brought on by independence. Many of the promises Bolívar made,
particularly those concerning slavery, would later go on to be broken. However, what Bolívar’s
speeches do demonstrate, is the discursive power of citizenship in early republican Latin
America. Bolívar specifically chose to appeal to slaves and indigenous peoples by offering not
just freedom or the end of the tribute, but the status of ciudadano as well. Despite the fact that in
1816 there was no extant republic, Bolívar recognized that the offer of a place in it was still an
extremely powerful way of convincing plebeians that independence was worth fighting for. From
an early stage, some letrados were beginning to understand the importance of the citizenship to
plebeians.
Bolívar was by no means unique in promising that independence would give plebeians a
place in the republic. Indeed, the Venezuelan Congress paid patriot soldiers in bonds redeemable
for land.36 The plebeian soldier, having already been identified as a citizen, was now also
promised the land that would give him economic independence. Equally, the laws around
citizenship were colorblind, and the constitution guaranteed racial equality, reinforcing Bolívar’s
promise that slaves could become citizens.37 Nor were these developments confined to South
America. In Mexico, the application of the Spanish Constitution of 1812 by the trigarantine army
meant the abolition of caste distinctions and indigenous tribute.38 Across Latin America,
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plebeians were told that citizenship was not simply a vague promise, rather, it signified greater
national inclusion and economic independence. The decisive nature of plebeian participation in
the wars of independence forced elites to alter what it would mean to be a ciudadano.
Notions of citizenship would not be solely crafted by letrado elites, however. Plebeians
would play a direct role in reshaping them throughout the early republican period. Even as
independence was only just achieved in Mexico, a group of female slaves wrote to Agustín de
Iturbide, demanding their freedom on the basis “that all the inhabitants of this America are
Citizens.”39 Plebeians challenged elites to live up to their high-minded ideals. Elite’s legal
chicanery over who exactly was included or excluded in their promises of equality were
irrelevant to plebeians who realized that their conditions did not match the rhetoric. In the 1830s
and 40s, when centralist constitutions denied peasants citizenship, indigenous peasants continued
to describe themselves as ciudadanos in defiance.40 For plebeians, regardless of what a
constitution drafted in a far-off capital said, the fact that they were actively involved in, and
affected by, politics, made them citizens. Increasingly, traditional elite notions of what
constituted citizenship lost all currency among plebeians.
Indeed, the rights of citizenship were invoked by plebeians in ways that none of the
drafters of those rights likely anticipated. In southern Colombia, the residents of Cali protested in
an 1849 petition that liquor monopolies violated their rights as citizens. Just as in Mexico,
plebeians invoked the right of citizenship even though it was legally denied to them. 41 Further,
Cali’s plebeians associated citizenship with not just political, but social rights as well. Taxes on
liquor production, by impeding plebeian’s livelihoods, were an affront to equality and freedom,
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the values which the new nations claimed to be based upon. Citizenship was reshaped by
plebeians so that it supported their claims to social equality and economic independence.42
Autonomy was an extremely important aspect of plebeian conceptions of citizenship. The
idea of social equality, that poor people did not inherently owe respect or deference to the
wealthy was powerful in southern Colombia, for example. This social independence was also
fundamentally tied to economic independence, and land in particular.43 In Mexico, Colombia,
and Venezuela, the hacienda system of agriculture was powerful in the countryside. Without
land, plebeians would be forced to labor under the authority of a hacendado and rely on their
wage and patronage for their survival. This of course compromised the social and political
independence of the plebeian. However, if a plebeian had land of his own, they became the
master of their own fate. As such, the importance of economic independence in plebeian notions
of citizenships was also bound with a need to access land without having to defer to another,
wealthier, man.
The importance of land to plebeians is seen most clearly in the discourse of indigenous
ciudadanos on their resguardos. These resguardos were parcels of lands owned and farmed
communally by indigenous peoples. Throughout the early republican period, the resguardos
increasingly came under attack by liberals, who argued that they were economically and socially
backwards, and that they should be replaced with individual private property, to the objections of
indigenous peoples.44 Appealing for aid in a land dispute, the residents of Caldono appealed to
the governor on the basis of the protection he was supposed to offer ciudadanos, and argued they
were “worthy of a better fate [than being dispossessed of their lands] owing to the simple fact of
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belonging to the great Granadan family.”45 Indigenous peoples asserted that the identity of indio
and ciudadano were not in conflict, and indeed that being ciudadanos entitled them to protection
against the usurpation of their lands. Further, the social and economic dimensions plebeians
attached to citizenship again emerge, as it is invoked defend their resguardos, and thus their
economic independence. Despite their communities being viewed as feudal relics, indigenous
plebeians defended their resguardos using the same revolutionary language of rights and
citizenship as liberals used to argue for their dissolution.
Perhaps the most radical invocations of citizenship came not from ciudadanos, but from
ciudadanas. Despite being legally excluded from citizenship, women were quick to incorporate
the new ideas into their discourse. Indeed, across Latin America, women had been active
participants in the wars of independence, and thus felt they too had a claim on the new nations
and the rights that accompanied them. In 1824, women in Zacatecas even petitioned for full
citizenship.46 While of course this petition was not granted, and no post-independence Latin
American country granted women citizenship, women asserted its rights anyway. As Reuben
Zahler notes, as early as the 1830s Venezuelan women suing for alimony in court began base
their arguments around appeals to citizenship and rights.47 Women, thus, also began to adopt the
identity of ciudadana in their efforts to gain equality.
Throughout Latin America, the Wars of Independence had given rise to a strong patriotic
culture of citizenship. While this culture may have first emerged in the rhetoric of patriotic
letrados, plebeians increasingly began to adopt the title of ciudadano, and use it to advance their
own goals. This development would be vital for the later emergence of liberal and nationalist
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movements in the 19th century. The extreme heterogeneity of Latin American states had the
potential to frustrate any attempt to forge a common national identity. However, the identity of
ciudadano provided diverse groups of people with the foundations of a shared identity. Indeed,
as noted above, by the 1850s some plebeians were already beginning to identify themselves as
members of a national family. This new patriotic citizenship thus bears a great deal of similarity
to the revolutionary-popular patriotism produced by the French Revolution, which saw the nation
as formed by the political choice of its members to try “…to renew it by reform or revolution.”48
Thus, the process by which old caste and corporate identities were superseded by national ones
was well under way by mid-century.
Interestingly, however, this culture of patriotic citizenship was as much a product of the
lack of revolutionary change as its presence. After independence, governments increasingly tried
to shut plebeians out of the political sphere. As noted above, plebeian’s adoption of the discourse
of citizenship throughout the 1830s and 40s was often in response to constitutional restrictions
that excluded them from citizenship based on wealth or land ownership. As such, plebeian
patriotism constituted a challenge to, rather than support of, the state. Further, the social and
economic dimensions that plebeians identified in citizenship ultimately brought them into
conflict with elites, both liberal and conservative. For example, in 1853, one Colombian plebeian
asserted his right to collect wood on private property on the basis of “Liberty, Equality,
Fraternity.”49 After the Wars of Independence plebeian and elite notions of citizenship began to
diverge to the point the plebeian ciudadano could be construed as a revolutionary challenge to
the status quo.
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The increasing radicalism of patriotic plebeian ciudadanos thus coincided with an
increasingly conservative turn in their states. In Mexico, the turn to centralism meant not only
the loss of citizenship for plebeians, but also restrictions on local autonomy. States were replaced
with departments, which granted the conservative national government the ability to appoint
governors. New regulations also significantly reduced the number of self-regulating
municipalities, leading to the wide-spread replacement of elected town councils with appointed
justices of the peace. Further the tax burden on plebeians was significantly increased, exceeding
the colonial tribute level.50 Throughout the 1830s and 40s in Mexico, conservative centralist
political projects challenged the ability of plebeians to rule themselves as ciudadanos.
In Colombia, a similar conservative project challenged the autonomy and dignity of
plebeians. Particularly in southern Colombia, the Cauca, the dominance of haciendas both
politically and economically forced plebeians into subservience to the wealthy.51
Aforementioned monopolies on aguardiente production, along with tobacco monopolies, were
particularly harmful to the poor. Indeed, the whole system of taxation, relying mostly on
consumption taxes, disproportionately burdened the poor.52 Particularly explosive in the Cauca
was the continuation of African slavery, and interference with the right of the poor to access the
public common lands, the ejidos. The latter issue had intensified with independence, as
hacendados increasingly attempted to fence off sections of the ejidos in order to annex them to
their property. Further, up until 1849, politics, both nationally and in the Cauca, was dominated
by the Conservative Party.53 Thus, the political domination of conservatives went hand in hand
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with the increasingly heavy economic and social burdens being placed upon plebeians in the
Cauca.
The situation in Venezuela was similar. Independence era armies had relied especially on
the llaneros, the rural poor of the southern Venezuelan plains, the llanos. While, as noted above,
these soldiers had been promised land, as a result of fraud and exchanges most of the vouchers
wound up in the hands of the officers, and land increasingly became concentrated in the hands of
the wealthy. Further, the llaneros often did not have deeds to the lands they still worked, and as a
result the government was able to sell many of these parcels off to large landowners. Finally, the
government led by letrados like Bolívar who were concerned that the rural poor were lazy, began
to implement jornalero laws that forced the landless poor to work for a hacendado or face arrest
as a vagabond.54 This sustained attack on the autonomy of plebeians further coincided with an
economic downturn caused by a drop in coffee prices and exacerbated by liberalized credit
laws.55 The conservative turn of the government and international economic fluctuations
combined to deny poor llaneros the place in the nation that they had been promised and had
fought for.
This conservative turn in government was met by an increasingly tenacious liberal
response, both from plebeians and their middle-class counterparts. Interestingly, across
Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia, liberals had a similar vocabulary for the conservative states.
When a group of liberal societies formed in the western regions of the Venezuelan Llanos, their
motto was “Popular election, alternative principle, order and horror to the oligarchy.”56 A few
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years later, when the young Colombian liberal lawyer Ramón Mercado took up a position in the
Cauca region, he found a society divided between oligarchs and the “despised masses.”57 In
Mexico, peasants referred to centralists as chaquetas and gauchupines, derisive names for
royalists during the wars of independence.58 While traditional analysis of post-independence
conflicts in Latin America may focus on personalities or political programs, actual participants
saw them in a different light. Conservative governments were seen as oligarchies that wanted
only the wealthy and powerful to be citizens and were often identified with the Spanish empire.
Meanwhile, they were opposed by a pueblo irredento, the rebellious and patriotic plebeian
ciudadanos who demanded they be recognized as part of the nation. The stage was set for a postcolonial reckoning over who the nation ought to represent.
Ezequiel Zamora and “Horror to the Oligarchy!”
In Venezuela, it was the events surrounding the election of 1846 that brought simmering
plebeian discontent to a boil. Throughout the late 1830s and early 1840s, conservatives José
Antonio Páez and Carlos Soublette had simply alternated presidential terms. However, in 1846,
the conservatives ran a new candidate, José Tadeo Monagas. In response, the liberals put forward
Antonio Leocadio Gúzman, a liberal intellectual who had obtained fame after being tried and
acquitted on charges of sedition the prior year. While Gúzman lost the presidential election, the
liberals did win municipal elections in the capital Caracas. In response, the Soublette
administration annulled the results, causing a political crisis. The liberals across the country were
outraged, but the national leadership refused to endorse an uprising. Gúzman and Páez arranged

57

Ramón Mercado, Memorias sobre los acontecimientos del sur de la Nueva Granada: Durante la administración
del 7 de marzo de 1849 (Bogotá: Imprenta Imparcial, 1855), XXV.
58
Guardino, Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico’s National State, 164.

Riley 26

to meet in the town of La Victoria in order to negotiate a settlement. This never came to pass, as
thousands of plebeians, some armed, cheered Gúzman along the road. Seeing the risk of popular
revolt and unwilling to risk turning the society upside down by provoking a plebeian revolution,
Gúzman never met with Páez.59
Actively following all of these events was Ezequiel Zamora, a young llanero merchant,
and a member of a small Liberal Society in the La Victoria region. The society, somewhat
similar to a political club, consisted of notable local liberals, and provided a forum for political
discussion. Zamora was active in politics, and he campaigned for the Liberal Party during the
elections of 1846. Likely due to his activism, prior to the election his citizenship rights were
stripped from him for four years by his local assembly.60 Angered by this, and by the
government’s suppression of liberal electoral victories, Zamora went to La Victoria for the
meeting between Páez and Leocadio. While there, Zamora conversed with local liberals and read
liberal newspapers, ultimately concluding it was necessary to “…make the revolution sin
conocer un caudillo…” asserting that a popular revolution did not require any elite backing.61 In
rejecting a caudillo, Zamora rejected the idea that the llanero liberals should rely on powerful or
wealthy sponsors for support. Local liberals were unimpressed by Gúzman’s reluctance to
confront Páez. Zamora and his fellow liberals, Dr. Manuel María Echeandía and Manuel Ibarra,
meeting not long after the events on the road, concluded that he was a coward, and if they wished
to resist the conservatives, they would be on their own.62
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However, without the support of the national liberal leadership, Zamora and his comrades
would have to find allies to fight with them. Having resolved that revolution was the only option,
the conspirators decided to seek that support in the llanos. Zamora himself was directed to
“…raise the people of the mountains and the lower llanos.”63 Rather than looking for support
among mantuano elites, Venezuela’s most radical liberals instead turned towards the rural poor
of the llanos. By seeking an alliance with the rural poor, Zamora offered the llaneros an
opportunity to influence national politics once again. In doing so, Zamora recognized that while
the constitution denied plebeians any place in the political sphere, plebeians still thought of
themselves as ciudadanos and members of the national community.
Zamora’s appeals to plebeians also emphasized discourses of citizenship. When asked by
his interrogator what he had offered plebeians in the village of Tacasuruma to convince them to
join him, Zamora responded “I did not offer them anything. They followed me because I invited
them to defend the patria, liberty, and the law that the oligarchs had broken.”64 His appeals thus
centered around liberty, and the duty of ciudadanos to rise up against a government that violated
the law, key aspects of citizenship. Furthermore, according to Zamora, this discourse was
successful in garnering recruits from the poor llaneros. This once again shows that the llaneros
thought of themselves as ciudadanos, and accepted they had a duty to defend their patria. Indeed,
Zamora’s choice to invoke the patria in his appeals exemplifies his incipient nationalist
discourse. However, the patria is invoked against the “oligarchs” of the government, thus
identifying the conservative government as itself an anti-national force. For Zamora, the poor
were the defenders of the patria against the machinations of the oligarchical government.
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For Zamora and his conservative opponents, the idea of patria had very different
meanings. Zamora’s conservative interrogator was seemingly both confused and aghast at
Zamora’s claims that his revolt was a defense of the patria, asking “How can you explain to me
your intention to serve your patria by taking up arms against the established government?”
Conservative notions of patria emphasized themes of legality and order, and of the duty of
ciudadanos to respect the established government. This is further emphasized in the interrogators
following question, asking whether or not Zamora was aware that a special law had outlawed the
liberal papers he was so fond of. 65 Thus, for conservatives, the patria was supposed to be orderly
and made up of ciudadanos who respected the government and social hierarchies. Such a
definition ultimately forced plebeians to either accept oppressive jornalero laws and
disenfranchisement or be excluded from the patria.
While radical liberals like Zamora also used appeals to constitutional principles and order
in their discourses, they had a more expansive definition of the patria. Responding to his
interrogator’s challenge, Zamora stated that he “…believed that a government that infringes the
law authorizes the citizens to rise in mass against it.”66 Later he further clarified his position,
stating “I rose against the government because it was said in the multitude of the newspapers…
that the government had infringed the constitution and laws of the Nation, I thought to render a
service to my patria, obeying the cry of all good ciudadanos…”67 While both Zamora and his
interrogator referenced legal obligation in defining the patria, they invoked the law for different
rhetorical purposes. The interrogator emphasized the obligations the law placed on individual
citizens to obey and preserve the social order and state. Zamora instead focuses on how the law
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and liberal principles constrained the government and obligated it to respect the rights of
ciudadanos. For Zamora, a government that broke those laws and norms was acting against the
patria, justifying a revolution of the ciudadanos. Thus, Zamora identifies patria more with the
people and their rights than with government. This distinction is vital, as a people-focused
definition of the patria was far more conducive to nationalist appeals, and secondly, because
Zamora chose to make this appeal to poor plebeians. When Zamora called on the residents of
Tacasuruma to perform their duty as ciudadanos and rise up against the oligarchy, he was not
only asserting their right to be ciudadanos, but also their right to a place in the republican patria.
Zamora’s discourse was not only nationalist in its invocations of the patria, but also in its
ability to unite different social groups in what he viewed as the defense of the patria. If the
ideology of the patria remained primarily the realm of letrado intellectuals, not affecting or even
known by the plebeian majority, a nation could not truly exist. The exigencies of wars spurred
Zamora to begin to bridge this divide. Asked how he had garnered recruits, Zamora responded
that he “Read the papers published by the liberal press to them… and they [his soldiers] loaded
them in abundance in their hats.”68 More than a simple recruiting method, this practice of reading
newspapers to plebeian liberals brought two different worlds together. On the one hand, there
was the world of letrado liberal journalists, who objected to the government’s violations of the
constitution and liberal principles. On the other, were the poor llaneros, denied their dignity by
constitutional exclusion from full citizenship through property requirements and jornalero laws.
By bringing the salon and the llanos together, Zamora was acting as a kind of mediator,
presenting liberal ideas, and more importantly the liberal party, to the poor as an ally in their
struggle for autonomy and equality. The choice of the soldiers to begin carrying the newspapers
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in their hats represents their enthusiasm for this proposition. Zamora was thus beginning to form
a truly national liberal movement, that could unite both rural plebeians and liberal journalists
under the banner of patria and liberty.
While it is obscured by his appeals to legality and the constitution, Zamora’s discourse
was very radical. He was not only contending that the llaneros were a part of the patria, but its
best defenders as well. In identifying the patria with the poor, he separated the wealthy
conservatives from the patria, indeed, casting them as an anti-patriotic force. Thus, the concept
of the nation proposed by Zamora turned the philosophy that had produced the jornalero laws on
its head, identifying the rural llaneros as the good and patriotic ciudadanos, while the wealthy
undermined their patria. Such a conception of the patria carried undertones of social rebellion
that were deeply frightening to conservatives. Indeed, Zamora’s interrogator accused him of
fomenting race war and planning to redistribute land. Of course, Zamora denied this and there is
no evidence that the liberal rebels ever supported such measures at that time.69 However, the
very action of putting weapons into the hands of plebeians and telling them that they were the
defenders of the patria upended a social structure that demanded subservience, not action, from
plebeians. The liberal nationalism that was developing under Zamora’s leadership was a
challenge to social and political hierarchies that were seen as impeding the nation, rather than to
territorial or political disunity.
Thus, while the ideas about patria and liberty that Zamora preached were derived from
letrado liberal journalists and politicians, Zamora was careful to present them in a fashion that
was appealing and relevant to plebeian llaneros. But, by altering the notion of patria so that it
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became a challenge to a social order that demanded deference and subservience from plebeians,
Zamora to some degree lost control of his own ideology. The assertion that plebeians were
coequal ciudadanos and part of the patria did not only imply a duty on the part of plebeians to
defend the nation, but also the right of plebeians to make demands on the nation. Zamora had
thus opened the door to allowing plebeians to themselves begin to define exactly what patria
meant. This plebeian nationalism thus began to have an important impact on the broader liberal
nationalism espoused by Zamora.
Ezequiel Zamora’s testimony is not the only window we have into the political views of
the plebeian rebels. Though not from Zamora’s band specifically, the interrogations of one group
of captured liberals has been preserved. The vast majority of the captured rebel rank-and-file
were laborers and artisans, while the leaders were hacendados and merchants.70 Similar to
Zamora, the plebeian soldiers declared that they had joined the rebellion to defend the law and
constitution against an abusive elite. However, plebeians also condemned how the government’s
policies oppressed the poor. One carpenter even related how their battle cry was “Viva the
government and death to the oppressors!”71 Even though the government was currently in the
hands of the same oppressors they condemned, the llanero rebels chose to separate, and indeed
place in opposition to one another, the government and the oppressors. For plebeian liberals, the
duties of the government were seen as more expansive. Not only did it have to adhere to the legal
norms established in the constitution, it also had to respect the rights of the poor, and not try to
take from them their status as ciudadanos. An oppressive government could not, in their view, be
legitimate. Rather, they and their liberal allies, as patriotic ciudadanos rising up against
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oppression, were the true government. Plebeians, noting the language that men like Zamora used
to condemn the governments violations of the constitution, used similar themes to condemn the
social oppression the government had foisted on them.
Thus far, this section’s focus has been on the political and social dimensions that formed
the intersecting nationalisms and understandings of patria of Zamora and his plebeian soldiers.
However, another important aspect of nationalism, particularly in the 19th century, was its link to
the romantic movement. Indeed, romanticized poetry, art, and history were often used to convey
ideas of national identity and values. Zamora, by the time of the rebellion, had clearly begun to
inculcate romanticized and patriotic notions of Venezuelan history. Asked by his interrogator
what means he intended to use to win his rebellion, Zamora responded that “… having read in
the history of Venezuela how General Páez, with only his valor and his devotion to the tricolor
flag, had triumphed over entire lines of the enemies of the patria, I proposed to imitate him,
exhorting my comrades with the same expressions…”72 Zamora’s notion that patriotic devotion
alone was enough to win the Wars of Independence fits in perfectly with the romantic liberal
nationalism of the era. His choice to use Páez as the exemplar of patriotic devotion, however,
seems strange and counterproductive, as Páez was one of the conservative leaders that Zamora
had revolted against. But, interestingly, Páez, though a conservative, was not from the traditional
mantuano elite, but was himself a llanero, who had helped turn the tide in the Wars of
Independence when he and his army of llanero plebeians allied with Bolívar. Zamora’s
comments can thus be seen as a subtle dig at Páez and the conservatives, who, while having been
patriotic in their fight for independence, had ultimately betrayed the poor llaneros who had
formed the basis of their armies. It was for the new generation of patriotic llaneros, like Zamora
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and his comrades, to set right the wrongs done by Páez. As such, while Zamora’s liberal
nationalism was heavily influenced by romantic notions of patriotism and history, he employed
those ideas in order to further emphasize the rhetorical divide between patriotic llaneros and
traitorous oligarchs.
Another important aspect of Zamora’s use of romantic tropes was how it framed the
present conflict between liberals and conservatives in reference to the Wars of Independence. By
stating that in rebelling, he and his comrades were simply imitating Páez’s triumphs over “the
enemies of the patria,” Zamora was associating the present conservative oligarchy with the
Spanish Empire. This is not to say that Zamora viewed the conservatives as covert royalists or
Spaniards. Rather, it shows how by the 1840s, “the oligarchs” had begun to step into the
rhetorical role the Spanish Empire had previously played, that of the “enemy of the patria.” Thus,
rather than radical liberal and plebeian nationalism being directed against another nation or
people, it was directed against an internal elite or oligarchy that was seen as abusing its power
and wealth for its own gain and at the expense of the rights and dignity of the ciudadanos. This
distinction in who was classified as an enemy of the patria helps explain why nationalism could
be so appealing to plebeians in early republican Latin America.
Romantic nationalism was not only a way for Zamora to frame his rebellion, it also
provided a code of conduct. Asked by his interrogators whether he planned during the rebellion
to kill “all the oligarchs,” Zamora responded that he “…proclaimed various times to my troops
with very serious warnings that they should not commit any criminal act, making them see and
inculcating in them that such abominable and anti-social conduct was only worthy of Boves and
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Cisneros.” Boves and Cisneros were both royalist commanders during the Independence Wars.73
Zamora measured the conduct of himself and his troops against a pantheon of heroes and villains
derived from the Independence Wars. While rebellion against an unjust government was a
patriotic action, and the duty of good citizens, for plebeians to wage social war against the elites
as a class, rather than as purely ideological foes, was a crime equal to any committed by the
enemies of the patria. This seems to be an attempt on Zamora’s part to reassert some of the
control over the idea of patria he had lost when he asserted that plebeians too had a right to a
place in it. While Zamora, as a radical liberal, was comfortable with the idea that plebeians were
ciudadanos and deserving of equal respect, he still saw plebeians as only one part of a wider
multiclass liberal and nationalist coalition which opposed the elite oligarchs not solely because
they were wealthy and powerful, but because they abused their power.
Ultimately, however, Zamora’s rebellion failed. The conservative government deployed
large numbers of troops, which overwhelmed the rebels’ small bands, and captured Zamora. It
thus seemed that the conservatives were again firmly in control of the reins of power by the time
their candidate, José Tadeo Monagas, finally assumed office in March 1847. However, to the
conservatives’ horror, Monagas promptly appointed a liberal cabinet, commuted the sentences of
liberal leaders including Zamora and Guzmán, and began to support liberal policies. Monagas
had effectively switched parties, provoking the wrath of the conservatives, but winning him the
support of the nation’s liberals. However, the congress, still controlled by the conservatives,
bitterly opposed Monagas’s attempts to push liberal reforms through by decree. By 1848,
tensions had reached such a point that on January 24th liberal caraqueños stormed the congress
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building.74 This uprising, coming slightly less than a month before the February Revolution in
France, thus constitutes the first revolution of 1848.
Páez, outraged at the events in the capital, promptly proclaimed a revolt against Monagas
on the 4th of February. In many ways, Páez’s proclamation was similar to Zamora’s earlier
proclamations, calling on Venezuelans to rise up against the “enemies of the patria,” who had
broken the constitution.75 However, the proclamation, while incorporating patriotic themes,
remained a fundamentally conservative appeal, focusing on how “the members of the congress
risked their lives to save the institutions of the republic.”76 Indeed, when Páez did reference
patriotic devotion, it was found in “…those venerable patriots…” among the congress or “…the
true patriots…” showing that even Páez himself felt the need to distinguish between the “true”
patriotism of the elite and the radical patriotism of plebeians.77 While the rebellion of 1846 had
brought politics that hinged on patriotic appeals to plebeians to stand up as ciudadanos to defend
their patria, conservatives were still clinging to the idea that plebeians could be kept out of both
politics and the patria.
Monagas was far better attuned to the new political realities. Releasing his own
proclamation in response four days later, Monagas thundered:
Venezuelans: The patria calls you to defend her liberty and save your rights. A
criminal and detestable conspiracy captained by… [Páez]… has raised its
denigrated standard… he has raised against the patria, in imitation of the other
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tyrants of America, the sword that was given to him for the defense of her
institutions… he will not find traitors who follow him… no, in Venezuela there
are no vile slaves that prefer ignominy to liberty, the arbitrary regime to the placid
and beneficial rule of law. Venezuelans, the government that watches over the
defense and conservation of our rights, counts on the most secure triumph;
nothing can resist the impulse of your patriotism, your pure love of the
constitution, and that irresistible valor…78
From the start, Monagas frames the declaration as a patriotic call to arms, but not simply for
plebeian liberals to defend the institutions of the patria, but its liberty and their rights as well.
While Monagas also references the importance of republican institutions, similar to Zamora he
contends Páez and the elite are the true threat to them, whereas the plebeians who stormed the
congress were their true defenders. While Monagas does appeal to the rule of law and order,
ultimately it is the government’s role as a protector of the rights of the people that legitimizes it
and earns it the valorous patriotism of plebeians. Monagas’s proclamation thus adopted similar
rhetoric to that used by Zamora and his llanero soldiers in the 1846 rebellion. Monagas had
learned from the mistakes of Leocadio Guzmán two years before, and instead of shunning
plebeian nationalism, he actively appealed to it.
The January Revolution was the culmination of the Rebellion of 1846. Angry plebeians,
rejecting a political system that excluded them, and a social hierarchy that oppressed them,
stormed the very center of state power, and forced the reorganization of the government. They
did so under the blessing of president who, just as the leaders of the 1846 rebellion had done,
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appealed to them on the basis of their membership in the patria, and their rights and duties as
ciudadanos. Ultimately this blow was too powerful for the conservative oligarchy to fend off.
Government forces, along with liberal militias that included Ezequiel Zamora, ultimately
defeated Páez and forced him into exile later that year.79
While the historiography of 1848 has largely analyzed the revolutions as if they were a
solely European event, contemporaries thought differently. Later in the year, another Venezuelan
liberal, Rafael Acevedo, wrote his own response to Páez’s proclamations, in which he declared
that “the event of the 24th of January was a glorious one, like that of the 24th of February that
dissolved the French legislature and established a republic: it was an event that the Venezuelan
people will remember with pride, because it will serve as a terrible lesson to the delegates of the
people in all representative governments that they should never think to abuse their power…”80
The 24th of January was not considered somehow lesser than the events that followed in Europe,
indeed, Acevedo saw both events as part of a wider transatlantic series of revolutions. He was
even convinced that its example, rather than that of France, would remain foremost in the minds
of future generations. The primavera de los pueblos began not in Europe, but in Latin America.
However, while certainly the January Revolution was part of a transatlantic trend, it was
produced by processes unique to Venezuela. It had begun not in the power centers on the coast,
like Caracas, but at the margins of Venezuelan society, in the llanos, and it was led not by major
national politicians, but by the relatively unknown members of a rural liberal society. The
crucible of revolution in Venezuela was the interaction between plebeians, who demanded
inclusion in the patria as ciudadanos, and radical liberal mediators, who presented their cause
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and party as the best ally plebeians had in their struggle. The intersection of plebeian nationalism
with Zamora’s liberal program resulted in a new radical liberal nationalism, that incorporated
aspects both elite and plebeian conceptions of the patria. Ultimately, it would be this ideology
that Monagas would use to justify and defend the January Revolution. Of course, Monagas was
clearly opportunistic in his sudden adoption of the new rhetoric of patria. At the same time, the
fact that an opportunist would choose to appeal to the nationalism of plebeians is a testament to
its power in the political sphere. What exactly the patria ought to be was decided in concert with,
rather than imposed on, plebeians.
Ramón Mercado and the Social Revolution in Spanish America
As Venezuelans grappled with the aftermath of the January Revolution, across the border
in Colombia, an electoral campaign was beginning. By the late 1840s, the Conservative and
Liberal parties had begun to take shape, and in the elections of 1848, they contested the
presidency. While the Conservatives relied mostly on personalistic appeals through patronage
networks and bribery, the Liberals appealed to the masses by promising that their candidate,
former independence wars general José Hilario López, would defend liberty from the oligarchy,
and protect the right of the poor to access public lands. Rather than emphasizing the personal
virtue or intelligence of the candidate, this new style of campaigning, which focused on concrete
policies and a new vision for the nation, appealed directly to the rural poor, while deeply
frightening the conservatives.81 Despite the fear López awoke in the traditional elite, he managed
to win in the elections, and his new liberal administration took office on the 7th of March 1849.
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López promised that the new government would be “… of the pueblo and for the pueblo.”82
Colombians, too, were excited to take part in the primavera de los pueblos.
In the southern Cauca, a young lawyer named Ramón Mercado watched the events in
Bogotá with growing excitement. While in the north things had begun to change, Mercado
observed that in the south, “No republican feature shows in that province of señores and serfs…”
The southern provinces “presented such an aspect of hispanicism and colonialism that an
impartial observer could not but have believed…” themselves to be living in medieval times.83 In
Mercado’s view, independence had wrought no effect on the social order of the south, which
remained mired in a feudal and hierarchical state, denying the poor their humanity. Further, the
situation was not just feudal, but colonial, in Mercado’s view a direct consequence of the three
preceding centuries of Spanish colonialism. Mercado even went so far as to argue that “… the
war against Spain was not a revolution… it did not but modify very superficially the epidermis
of the social problem… so América was nationalized, the chain tying it like a slave across the
oceans to the Catholic Throne broken, [however] always continued the brandishing of the whip
raised over the people.”84 While independence had given Latin Americans political
independence, on a social level they were still dominated by the hierarchies established by
Spanish colonialism. For Mercado, political change alone could not bring about the true republic.
Rather, the social system that privileged powerful land owners over the rural poor had to be
dismantled before a truly democratic society could be constructed.
At the core of the Cauca’s afflictions was slavery. In Mercado’s view, the institution
caused society to lose any conception of the humanity of the slaves, leading to abuse and “many
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cases of slave deaths due to the cruelty of their señores, without the society becoming alarmed,
nor were made useful the attributes and properties of justice.” Besides the dehumanizing affects
inherent in it, slavery was also buttressed by a “Certain solidarity between the slaveowners…” to
protect their common interests against any investigation into their treatment of their slaves, a
solidarity which made all masters complicit in the misconduct of the others, regardless of how
each treated their own slaves.85 Mercado’s analysis thus condemns the masters of the Cauca not
as individuals, but as a class which exploited the poor for their own benefit and abused their
privileged position in society to shield themselves from prosecution. Just like Zamora in
Venezuela, Mercado identified the great social ills of society as being perpetrated by an abusive
and undemocratic oligarchy. However, Mercado went beyond Zamora in arguing that the slaveowning oligarchy was more than a group of immoral elites, but rather constituted an inherently
unjust class.
While deeply concerned with the economic and political aspects of the hierarchies of the
Cauca, Mercado was also concerned with how the social order preserved colonial caste
distinctions. Within the aristocratic social order of the Cauca, “The populations, then, were
divided in diverse classes, characterized with denigrating and depressive names like, mulatos,
zambos cuarterones, mestizos &c.” Rather than adhering to the juridical color blindness
independence had brought, racial distinctions still determined the position and opportunities of
the Cauca’s people.86 While Mercado was most immediately concerned with the inequality the
unofficial caste system caused, castes also presented a threat to the very idea of a Colombian
nation. The use of racial castes to categorize population ran directly contrary to the idea that all
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were coequal citizens and members of a single national community. When the caste system
combined with “the terrible distribution of land ownership” in the south the result was that,
rather than a flourishing nation of equals, “… an aristocracy with all the habits of the Spanish
nobility…” dominated over the “jente del pueblo.”87
Mercado’s political vision was not confined solely to his own nation. Across Latin
America, every nation was struggling with the still powerful legacies of the Spanish Empire.
There was “oppression… in Peru, oppression in Chile… oppression in Buenos Aires, oppression
in Ecuador, oppression in New Grenada! Silence in América!”88 Despite the great challenges
Mercado saw in Latin America’s path, he remained optimistic about its future. Inspired by the
Ecuadorian Revolution of 1845 and the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe, Mercado argued that the
time had come for a “social revolution in Spanish America” that would at long last sweep away
… the exploitation of the poor, the chains of the slave, the cries ripped from the helpless,
of gibbets and gallows, tributes demanded from the worker for the benefit of the
privileged vagabond, of injustice and inequity, the abomination that Spain had forged for
América...89
Mercado envisioned all Latin America as engaged in a great struggle between the oppression
implanted in it by Spain, and the renovating spirit of a republicanism that championed not just
the ideal of democracy, but the cause of the poor and oppressed against the aristocracy. This
rhetoric of an oligarchy associated with Spanish colonialism confronted by the poor, is deeply
similar to Zamora’s appeals for causing “horror to the oligarchy,” made only a few years earlier
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in Venezuela. At the same time, however, Mercado’s appeal went farther than Zamora’s, calling
not just for opposition to the constitutional trespasses of the oligarchy, but for a social revolution
to wash out all injustice from not just Colombia but Latin America as a whole.
With López’s liberal administration taking office on the 7th of March, Mercado was eager
to make his vision of social revolution reality in the Cauca. On the 20th of July, Mercado and
other liberals founded a “Democratic Society” in the city of Cali, with between 800 and 1000
ciudadanos attending the first meeting.90 The society, named after a society of artisans in
Bogotá, had its roots in the liberal societies that had helped propel Hilario López to the
presidency in 1848-49. However, rather than being a mere electoral society, this new society
provided a space where men, whatever their social status, could gather to discuss politics and
hear the latest news.91 Cali’s society first turned its attention towards protesting against the
aguardiente monopolies that threatened the livelihoods of the poor and against slavery. The
society also appointed “agents of peace,” who were tasked with cultivating in the society’s
“members a spirit of conciliation and Christian fraternity...”92 The society thus not only sought to
provide the poor a chance to voice their grievances, it also sought to cultivate in them a sense of
fraternity through shared struggle. This message of fraternity was a challenge to the caste system,
and an attempt to integrate the poor as equals into the nation. Mercado and his fellow caucano
radical liberals hoped to bring the poor into the nation by joining them in their struggle against
social injustices.
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More than a political or mutual aid society, Cali’s Democratic Society served as the
center of national fraternity in Caucano society. The society proclaimed as its motto “every
ciudadano should know two things, to provide their subsistence and to defend their patria.”93 The
society thus asserted from the outset that the rural poor were, as ciudadanos, a part of the
national community, and thus had an obligation to defend the patria. Interestingly, this obligation
to the patria is placed directly alongside the obligation to support oneself and family, identifying
the national family with the individual family. Further, the identification of subsistence and the
defense of the patria imbues the patria with sense that it is life-giving, as vital to human existence
as water or bread. This connection drawn between the patria and subsistence is particularly
subversive, considering, as noted above, the greatest challenge the poor of the Cauca faced was
the absorption of their ejidos by hacendados. Beyond its motto, the society also required that its
members enlist in the national guard.94 The obligation of national guard service, besides
providing another pulpit from which to teach patriotic values, also provided the poor an
opportunity to participate in a national institution, an opportunity previously denied to them by
constitutional exclusion from citizenship. The Caucanos would not only be taught what the patria
was by radical mediators, but also carve their own place in it.
The foundation of this “Democratic Society,” was not welcomed by conservatives, who
called Mercado and his allies “red democrats,” and eventually founded their own “Society of the
Friends of the People,” towards the end of 1849 in an attempt to compete with the liberals.95 The
dispute between the two societies began to intensify in March, as the liberals prepared to
celebrate the first anniversary of the López administration taking office on the 7th.
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To demonstrate their popularity to the Society of the Friends of the People, the
Democratic Society decided to organize a celebration of the anniversary. However, the
Democratic Society was unfortunately left without any music to accompany their party, as the
entirety of the local philharmonic society was made up of conservatives. The party was thus held
in silence, but, in Mercado’s words, the silence “… that ordinarily precedes the great eruptions of
volcanoes.” The conservatives, hoping to upstage the orchestrally challenged liberals with their
own party on the 10th, organized a gathering of “noisy pomp.” Two hundred conservative
militiamen (who are referred to by Mercado as “guapetones”) even came from another town in
the Cauca. Cali’s democráticos, fearing a potential mutiny against the government, organized to
disrupt the sonorous conservative gathering. When the conservatives left their gathering place to
march through the town, shouting their customary “vivas i mueras,” they confronted by a crowd
of plebeians, shouting challenges and impeding them from exiting. Mercado saw this as the first
true confrontation between “the people, wanting to assert themselves, and the haughty oligarchy,
who look on them like a dream, full of rage and contempt.”96
Reflecting on the results of the near-violent confrontation between the liberals and
conservatives of Cali, Mercado remarked that “Separated until then, the plebe from the nation…
and in the effervescent state of the parties, to ask of them prudence was the same as to ask calm
of a furious sea.”97 In the decades after independence, the plebeians of the Cauca, due to having
been dominated by the conservative hacendados who controlled the land, had been excluded
from the nation. However, with the foundation of the Democratic Society, the poor had been
offered a voice in society, a voice they eagerly used to defend their liberal allies against the
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increasingly hostile conservatives. Indeed, Cali’s liberal party was “composed almost exclusively
of the scorned masses.”98 In giving the poor a voice in politics, the Democratic Society had also
given them a stake in the nation, as plebeians would work side by side with liberal mediators to
make reforms that would improve their conditions. Mercado’s fiery brand of radical liberal
nationalism encouraged popular politics not as a solely electoral or strategic tool, but as a way to
bridge the gap between plebian and nation.
Liberal efforts towards nationalist reform were, however, beginning to run up against
political resistance. The governor of the province of Buenaventura, Dr. Manuel Dolores
Camacho, was a wealthy landowner and conservative, who supported his own financial interests
over the “interests of the public.” However, the time was coming to name a new governor to the
province, and the liberals threw their weight behind Ramón Mercado.99 While the idea of
Mercado as governor horrified “the oligarchy of the south,” the constitution permitted President
López to select the new governor, and he promptly settled on Mercado.100 Mercado reflected
how the foundation Democratic Society and the 7th of March Administration had fundamentally
altered his native Cauca. As the traditional conservative elite lost its grip on power, and the caste
system was increasingly discarded, “the popular masses of the south” transformed into “active
entities, whose efforts directed to break the chains of the oppressed, raised on high their rights,
against the exceptional causes that served as titles of tyranny.”101 The masses, once oppressed by
feudalism, were now the redemptive and revolutionary force that, under the banner of the Liberal
Party, would sweep the oligarchy from power.
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Regardless of Mercado’s constitutional right to assume the governorship, from the very
beginning he had to rely on popular support to sustain his administration. On the day of
Mercado’s inauguration, the conservatives, led by the powerful local hacendado, Julio Arboleda,
planned to disrupt the ceremony with a protest. They arrived armed and uniformed, prepared for
a fight with “the poor democráticos of the ruana.”102 As the conservatives began denouncing the
government during the ceremony, Mercado’s plebeian supporters responded with “vivas to the
government in the corridors of the house and at the side of the street.” While the situation was
volatile, after Mercado officially took power, he was able to calm matters.103 With the political
participation of the masses, the struggle between liberal and conservative societies began to show
aspects of class struggle. The wealthy launched their offensive with the hope of constraining the
political influence of plebeians, while the “men of the ruana” rushed to defend their party,
leading to open fighting in the streets. However, while class was an aspect of the unfolding
struggle in Cali, Mercado identifies the plebeian’s revolutionary potential not solely in their
condition as a class, but in their commitment to democratic ideals. Indeed, Mercado later noted
that it was at “at the side of the popular mass” that he “encountered the inspiration of the
democratic idea.”104 The poor were identified as the true bearers of the standards of progress and
freedom, against the power of the wealthy oligarchs.
Just as Mercado saw plebeians as democracy’s best allies, he also saw them as the natural
defenders of the nation. Concerned about the growing conflict between the conservatives and
liberals, and worried about the possibility of civil war, Mercado resolved to call on “all the
ciudadanos, from one or the other faction” to join the national guard. In calling for this patriotic
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levée en masse, he hoped to gather the “true republicans,” who would be ready to defend the
government in the event of war. His call was immediately heard by the local liberals and
democratic society members, the “generality” of whom enlisted immediately. The conservatives
however largely refused to join, not wishing to be confused with “the plebe or the men of the
ruana.”105 The Democratic Society’s work in the Cauca was paying dividends, as plebeians
eagerly rushed to defend the nation when called upon. Meanwhile, the wealthy avoided that duty,
showing open contempt for the institution. Enthusiastically patriotic, plebeians were angered by
the conservative’s lack of patriotism, and a number of the conservative’s supporters went over to
the “democratic ranks.” The open decision of the conservatives to show that they followed “the
flags of the oligarchy” rather than the national one, had caused an outburst of nationalist anger
among plebeians.106 Just as had occurred in Venezuela, the traditional idea that the wealthy were
the only true patriots was turned on its head, as plebeians increasingly saw themselves as the
defenders of the nation against anti-patriotic oligarchs.
The social system of the Cauca was thus falling apart. Radical plebeians denounced the
wealthy as antipatriotic, took up arms, and engaged in street fights against conservatives to
support their candidates. The challenge that combative and revolutionary plebeian masses posed
frightening to conservatives and many elite liberals as well, as it threatened to undo the social
and economic system that empowered them.107 Mercado, however, while at times concerned by
the possibility of violent excesses made by plebeians, never saw them as a destructive, irrational
or apolitical force. Hoping to clarify the popular cause, Mercado gave an address to the public, in
which he identified the chief causes of discontent. Among them, he identified slavery, the abuse
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of tenants and debtors by the propertied, monopolies, and first and foremost “the conduct of
some of the propertied relative to the disputed lands of the ejidos.”108 The masses were not
fighting solely for political change, but for a fundamental change in the distribution of land and
wealth in society. Though the defense of the ejidos and the rights of debtors and tenants
contradicted traditional liberal notions of property, Mercado, as a social revolutionary, was
sympathetic to the plebeians’ demands. Indeed, in his view, the whole system of land tenure and
the predicament of the landless poor was not the product of free institutions, but the implantation
of Spanish colonialism. The “future of liberty” that shone in “the avid eyes of the masses” was
thus not mere political democracy, but a social revolution, that would redistribute power more
equally across society.109
To all the tumults and struggles that came with plebeian radicalism, Mercado gave the
name “epoch of renacimiento,” rebirth.110 The phrase calls to mind the Italian risorgimento, and
the struggles for national liberation that characterized the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe.
However, when Garibaldi or Mazzini called for risorgimento, it was in opposition to an imperial
overlord, Austria. Mercado on the other hand, called for renacimiento in the face of a domestic
oligarchy. Still, while this oligarchy was not imperial, radical liberal nationalists like Mercado
identified it with colonialism. As we have seen, they argued that “the oligarchy” was the
continuation of the same injustices of colonial rule, perpetuating the economic, political, and
spiritual evils of Spanish colonialism even after the empire’s dissolution. Thus, the struggle
against the oligarchy was conceived of as a nationalist movement to free Colombia, and Latin
Americas as a whole, from the vestiges of colonialism. That radical liberals in Latin America
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directed their nationalist crusade against an internal oligarchy, rather than an external empire, is
vital to understanding its social radicalism. In opposing the wealthy oligarchy, radical liberals
found their best allies in plebeians. This incorporation of plebeians into the nationalist coalition
meant the struggle increasingly had to be waged for social as well as political rights. The very
way radical liberals in 19th Latin America conceived of nationalism thus inherently drove them
towards social revolution.
The political and social struggle between plebeians and elites only intensified as 1850
came to an end. On December 30th, when a group of 200 some conservatives marched armed
through the streets condemning the government, plebeians confronted them with stones and
sticks. In the ensuing fighting, the conservative’s leader, Antonio Boso, was captured, and turned
over to local authorities. Mercado ultimately decided to release Boso and the other prisoners,
under the condition they left the province.111 The events of December 30th preceded a larger
plebeian revolt, known as the Zurriago. Beginning in Cali in early 1851, plebeians, especially
former slaves, took to the streets armed with whips and clubs, attacking wealthy hacendados and
conservatives. As the revolt spread outwards to the rest of the Cauca, haciendas and property
were destroyed.112 After months of scuffles, traded insults, and the fiery speeches of Mercado
against the oligarchy, the Cauca’s plebeians launched an all-out attack against aristocratic
privilege in the valley. The assaults on haciendas, and use of the whip against slave-owners,
simultaneously undermined the symbolic and economic underpinnings of the social hierarchy.
Mercado’s social revolution had finally begun.
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Plebeians’ assaults on the social order went beyond attacks on individuals and raids of
property, however. During the Zurriago, plebeians launched their most significant effort thus far
to reclaim their ejidos, common lands, from the fences constructed by encroaching hacendados.
Mercado witnessed the destruction of the fences around Cali, and provided a stirring description
of events:
The unhappy women, wood-gathers and colliers, their children even in infancy, their
fathers and their brothers, the elderly of both sexes that lived on the benefits of that land,
all were sworn enemies of the fences placed by the propertied; whole swarms of those
poor and needy families all night surrounded those weak barriers against necessity and
justice: driven by the sting of hunger and calmed, so to speak, in their consciences by the
weeping of their children that demanded the sustenance that could not be provided until
now, they opened a pass throughout the odd hours of the night by iron and fire, to
penetrate again to the fields that for so many years had been their hope, their solace, and
their patria113
Mercado recognizes the struggle of the poor for their ejidos as a struggle for the patria. The
social structure, the political system, and the distribution of lands in the Cauca had long denied
plebeians any place or role in national life. This exclusion of the plebeian majority had robbed
the nation of its vitality, leaving it only an oligarchic state that served as little more than a cruel
mockery of democracy. While the events since 1848 had begun to renovate the political spirit of
the masses, Mercado recognized that as long as land, and the power that accompanied it, were
concentrated into the hands of the oligarchy, political progress would be tenuous at best. While
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Mercado thus abandoned traditional liberal commitment to property rights, he did so to support
the social equality he felt necessary to build a democratic nation.
The events of the Zurriago show the major transitions that had occurred in the liberalnationalist coalition that had been taking shape since the founding of Cali’s democratic society.
At the outset, Mercado and his fellow radicals had taken the lead. Acting as mediators between
the party and its poor supporters, they used the Democratic Society as a forum to teach plebeians
about liberal notions of patria and democracy. They also saw themselves as spreading national
consciousness and commitment, especially through the expansion of the national guard. But
now, after more than a year of work, plebeians were becoming more assertive. They saw
themselves as patriotic democrats and ciudadanos, politically active and defenders of the nation.
With the Zurriago, plebeians had fought for greater autonomy under the same banners of patria
and liberty that the liberals had brought in 1849. Mercado and his fellow mediators were now
reacting to the political initiative that plebeians had taken on their behalf. The masses were
moving beyond subalternity, becoming, in concert with their mediator allies, the shapers of their
own reality.
The conservatives were horrified by the events of the Zurriago. Attacks on haciendas and
the destruction of fences reinforced their view that the liberals, through their alliance with
plebeians, had unleashed a general assault on private property. More disturbingly, attacks on
masters by former slaves and the poor armed with whips provided a powerful symbol of the
collapse of the social hierarchy. However, most disturbing of all was how middle-class liberals
like Mercado, rather than condemning the violence, supported the plebeians and blamed the
oligarchy for how it had oppressed the poor. When the national government responded to events
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by highlighting the need for abolition, conservatives were only more outraged.114 Liberal
nationalists and their plebeian allies seemed determined to destroy the social and economic
system that gave elites their prestige, wealth, and power. The situation in the Cauca was by now
so unbearable to the conservatives that no political solution would satisfy them. In April 1851,
Mercado received a letter from the liberal governor of nearby Popayán, informing him that the
conservatives planned to rise up in arms all across the south.115 The Civil War of 1851 had
begun.
Mercado quickly began organizing a response to the “seditious rising of April.” He
ordered the manufacturing of lances, while he warned other nearby governors of the threat. He
also called together the officers of the local national guard and militias, formulating with them a
plan for the campaign. Besides discussing their stocks of arms and military strategy, they
resolved to make a general “call to arms” to the ciudadanos.116 At five in the afternoon, the 24th
of April, Mercado officially issued the call to arms to the people. The response was immediate,
as men from across the city rushed to the plaza, and campesinos who had come from the fields
for market enlisted, pledging to return the next day. Mercado described the scene as close to
2,000 men filled the plaza: “Old men, young men, boys, all joined the mass in the public plaza,
crying: to arms and giving vivas to the government and the cause of the peoples.”117 Mercado
and the Democratic Society had clearly succeeded in their goal, as plebeians were rallying to the
defense of the Liberal Party, and what was now their patria. However, this war, fought as it was
against aristocratic rebels and under the banners of abolition and the defense of the ejidos, sought
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not just to defend the patria, but to transform it. What Mercado witnessed in the plaza was the
social revolution in arms.
The enthusiasm of the volunteers filled Mercado with pride. He noted how, with “heroic
patriotism,” the volunteers “forgot their interests, and gave perhaps the last goodbye to their
patria in order to serve it…” Plebeians were romanticized as the selfless defenders of the nation,
exemplary of the nationalism Mercado had hoped to spread. This nationalism was deeply
intertwined with commitment to the “Democratic cause.”118 Mercado understood the events of
April 1851 as decisive proof that Colombia had truly become both a nation and a democracy, not
just on paper, but in the minds of plebeians. This powerful conception of a radically democratic
Colombian nation permeated all aspects of the campaign, as some of the volunteers even elected
their own commander!119 The old social order was completely in tatters, as the most radical of
ciudadanos asserted their democratic rights even within the traditionally hierarchical military.
Thus, patriotism, a desire for social reform, and a fundamental belief in democracy all drove
plebeians to take up arms in the Spring of 1851.
As the columns of volunteers and national guards began to spread out across the Cauca,
they found a population receptive to their radical nationalism. As they entered towns and villages
throughout the region, local plazas were filled with scenes of patriotic devotion. In the hamlets of
Palmaseca and Arrastradero, approximately 300 hundred volunteers were rallied to the liberal
cause.120 While the radical liberal mediators had been most active in the city of Cali, their
ideology and program had wide appeal and impact in the countryside as well, drawing in more
volunteers. Indeed, throughout the war, liberal mediators would, in recruiting volunteers, work to
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incorporate more social groups into their nationalist project. For example, when the city of Cali
was threatened by conservative incursions, administrative accountant Liborio Mejia armed and
organized a company of Afro-Colombians. The new company was given the all-important task of
defending the local plaza against any attack.121 Middle-class professionals worked alongside
Afro-Colombian peasants and artisans to organize the defense of their homes and principles. The
war had created an exigency that helped transform ideas of national fraternity from academic
theory to the lived reality of both plebeians and mediators.
The vital importance of the politics of the plaza to radical liberal and plebeian nationalism
emerged throughout the war. Plazas, whether of important cities like Cali or small hamlets like
Palmaseca, provided an open space for democratic politics. People of different ethnic, cultural,
and class backgrounds could come together to hear speeches, meet local political figures, and
discuss politics themselves. In this way, the plaza came to represent a microcosm of the nation,
where local communities gathered to react to the evolving national politics and to assert their
influence on the nation. The plaza was plebeians’ most direct and accessible connection to the
wider nation. During the war, the plaza was thus the obvious place for plebeians and the national
guard to congregate in. Plebeians rushed to the plaza not just to volunteer, but to show their
support for the government and the change it represented through their words and deeds. As
such, the war of 1851 transformed plazas across the Cauca into patriotic symbols of the new,
democratic, Colombian nation.
Plebeians would do more than just guard their homes and plazas, however. Conservatives
had also risen up in the neighboring region of Antioquia and forced liberal general Tomás
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Herrera to retreat into the Cauca.122 Looking to aid their allies, Mercado and the administration
of Buenaventura resolved to raise a new column to defend the border with Antioquia. Between
the national guard, volunteers from the surrounding villages, and reinforcements from as far
away as Panama, the Caucanos were able to raise a force of 3,000 men. Meanwhile, Herrera
reorganized his army with the help of the “enthusiasm of the patriotic inhabitants of Rionegro.”
In the ensuing battle of Rionegro, Herrera triumphed, in large part due to “the valor of the
national guards,” and recaptured the Antioqueño capital of Medellín. Commenting on the
contributions of plebeian soldiers, Mercado reflected that the only recompense for the national
guards was “the embraces of their fellow ciudadanos and the limited but frank demonstrations of
profound gratitude and recognition. Such is the effort of the popular masses!”123
The Civil War of 1851 thus contributed to developing feelings of national fraternity in
plebeians not just through ideology, but practical experience as well. Much like the experience of
the French sans-culottes of 1792, in defense of their republic Colombian plebeians moved
beyond parochial experiences of politics and nation, as they marched to far-flung towns and
villages. In doing this, they united with other plebeian soldiers from distant villages and
provinces, all in the cause of the defense of the nation. The national community thus ceased to be
a primarily ideological construct, as it began to live in the ranks of the liberal armies. However,
unlike the experience of revolutionary France, this was not achieved through conscription
implemented by the national government, but by the cumulative effect of the actions of local
mediators and plebeians. The strength of the national guard was based on the organizational
efforts of the Democratic Societies, championed by figures like Mercado. The volunteers were
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organized and armed by local and state governments, or at times, simply raised through the
efforts of a single officer or politician. Meanwhile, as Herrera had found in Rionegro, plebeians
themselves excitedly volunteered and organized themselves for battle. The revolutionary
nationalist ethos grew out of the local context, and then burst into the national scene.
Amid the war, Mercado continued to rally the people to the liberal cause. On the 10th of
May, as conservative forces were on the retreat, Mercado spoke before the assembled people of
Cali. “Liberty, equality, and fraternity,” he declared, lived in “every one of the habitants of
Buenaventura,” along with “those glorious examples of selflessness, magnanimity, and heroism,
with which was marked the struggle for independence.”124 The Civil War of 1851 was thus
framed as a continuation of the wars of independence, fought for the same principles. The civil
war, however, had served to further democratize those principles, making them relevant to
plebeians’ lives. While independence had constituted the first call for a democratic Colombian
nation, the defeat of the postcolonial oligarchy in 1851 served as the vindication of that call. The
plebeians of Buenaventura were thus the new libertadores, continuing the work of the old.
Not long after the victories in Antioquia, the remaining rebels across the country were
defeated. The Caucano liberals were magnanimous in victory, both the local legislature and the
Democratic Society appealing for the government to offer clemency to the defeated, in hope of
national reconciliation.125 This desire, however, did not dampen the liberal’s zeal for reform.
Central to the laws passed by the national government in the wake of the victory was long and
hard-fought emancipation of the slaves. Further, monopolies were dismantled, and taxes reduced,
helping plebeians sustain their livelihoods. The legal system was also reformed, the death
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penalty abolished, and juries reorganized to better represent the entire population, and give
plebeians a say in justice.126 Taken together, these reforms achieved much of Mercado’s hoped
for social revolution. At the same time, the most important aspect of the social revolution
achieved in 1851 was not a new political reform, but a deeper realignment in society. The
struggle had ended the political, social, and spiritual servitude that had previously bound
plebeians. The end of servitude had further prepared the way for the final step in the revolution,
and the triumph of the nation – “Let us erase the distinctions of all kinds because we are all
brothers.”127
In the following years, plebeians would continue to assert their voices in political and
national life. In 1853, in the town of Turmequé in northern Colombia, conservative officials on
the cabildo attempted to commit electoral fraud, seeking the assistance of the local priest.
However, the priest refused to aid the conservatives. Angered, the conservatives forced the local
jefe politico to expropriate the priest’s house and put it up for auction. However, on the day of
the auction, the priest rallied the local indigenous communities to disrupt it. The shouts and
protests of the indios terrified the cabildo, which fled and locked themselves in their meeting
hall. Following their triumph, the protestors moved on to the jefe politico’s home, where they
began to throw rocks at the balconies, and at a local judge, causing him to flee. By this time, the
auction thoroughly disrupted, the priest convinced the protestors to disperse. The events had a
lasting impact on the local authorities however, for whom “fear made them see in every indio a
revolutionary like Robespierre.”128 Across the nation, plebeians and mediators aggressively
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challenged elites and officials, part of the rising tide of democratic politics since 1848. These
democratic politics gave the new nation a distinctly plebeian character. Plebeians, whether
Caucano patriots or indio revolutionaries contested elite’s decisions, and pushed them to uphold
the ideals of democracy and fraternity that the republic rested on. After 1851, the ciudadanos
were on the advance, and the oligarchy in retreat.
These developments at the margin increasingly found recognition on the national stage.
In 1853, President Hilario López gave his last major public address as president before the
convention drafting a new, liberal constitution. He opened the address with traditional radical
liberal rhetoric, exalting how the republic had put the “principles of this century in front of the
castles and lions of Spain…”129 The new constitution was indeed radical, achieving the liberals
most revolutionary aims. Slavery was prohibited in perpetuity, guaranteeing human servitude
would never resurface in Colombia. The limits of nation and citizenship were also expanded, as
universal manhood suffrage, and the assertion that anyone born in Colombia was a Colombian,
formalized the expansive political and national communities.130 While the politics of inclusive
nationalism had begun at the margins of the Colombian state, it now found representation in the
state’s fundamental law.
The events that had rocked Colombia since 1848 bore deep similarity to those in
Venezuela after 1846. In both nations, local liberal societies, faced with the opposition of an
intransigent conservative oligarchy, formed an alliance with local plebeians. The protagonists of
these alliances, Ezequiel Zamora and Ramón Mercado, sought them not just to gain a political
advantage, but also because they hoped to spread a doctrine of radical liberal nationalism
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amongst plebeians. However, plebeians also influenced the character of the nationalist
movements, pushing them to reject not just political tyranny, but social oppression as well.
Zamora and Mercado responded to these challenges in different ways. While Zamora radicalized
his anti-oligarchy rhetoric politically, he discouraged his troops from making any attempt at
social revolution. Mercado, on the other hand, explicitly began to advocate for a social
revolution to end the oppression of the poor. During the Zurriago, he even supported campesinos
radical land seizures from haciendas. As such, while both Mercado and Zamora led similar
political projects, Mercado’s vision was significantly more radical.
From both Zamora and Mercado’s experiences thus emerges a common ideology of
radical liberal nationalism. This ideology had varied roots, inspired by enlightenment thought,
and, after 1848, Europe’s revolutionary experience, particularly that of France and Italy. At the
same time, the ideology also drew on a romantic and heroic understanding of the Wars of
Independence, and other political movements across Latin America, such as the Ecuadorian
Revolution of 1844. Thus, while the ideology drew some inspiration from Europe, it remained
distinctly Latin American. Both Zamora and Mercado’s versions of the ideology shared a
condemnation of the conservative oligarchies that dominated post-colonial Latin America. Using
strikingly similar rhetoric, Zamora and Mercado both argued that the political exclusion of
plebeians from society, and the tyrannical actions of oligarchs, had weakened feelings of national
fraternity, and undermined democracy. Further, both men conceptualized these oligarchies as
continuations of the oppression Spanish colonialism, which had to be defeated to facilitate
national rebirth. Mercado went so far as to argue the oligarchs were not just individual tyrants,
but a class that conspired to exploit the poor, contending that plebeians needed not only
expanded political rights, but social rights as well. Across Latin America, radicals were drawn
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towards nationalistic projects of social and political reform in an attempt to address the wrongs
of post-colonial society.
Closely tied to radical liberal nationalism was plebeian nationalism. Though mediators
like Mercado and Zamora may have seen themselves as the proselytizers of nationalism amongst
plebeians, in reality it had deep roots in plebeian political culture. As discussed earlier in this
study, the Wars of Independence had given rise to a culture of patriotic citizenship amongst
plebeians, as they demanded the political freedoms that elites claimed the wars had won. Further,
plebeians had long associated citizenship not just with political rights, but with social rights and
freedom from oppressive hierarchies as well. This patriotic culture provided a foundation for a
revolutionary nationalism emerging alongside liberal victories in the 1840s and 50s that
championed plebeians’ role as the defenders of the nation against the oligarchy. Further, this
nationalism emphasized a radical rejection of the post-colonial social order, and an assault on all
institutions and laws that oppressed the poor. This revolutionary spirit shone most clearly in the
January Revolution in Venezuela, and the Zurriago in Colombia. Plebeian nationalism and
plebeian political participation were thus intimately connected.
While there was at time friction between these two nationalist traditions, they by and
large existed symbiotically. The powerful motivation that nationalism instilled in plebeians gave
radical liberals the support they needed to defeat conservatives at both the ballot box and on the
battle field. For the most radical liberals, like Mercado, it also gave them a staunch ally in efforts
for social reform. Further, plebeian nationalism fit with the radical liberal program, which
actively hoped for the strengthening of feelings of national fraternity to underlie a more
democratic society. For plebeians, radical liberal nationalism gave them a set of rhetorical
discourses around notions of rights and citizenship that helped them make their arguments for
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inclusion. Furthermore, alliances with radicals gave plebeians the opportunity to influence
national politics, and to expand their role in the public sphere through institutions like the
national guard. In taverns, meeting halls, and plazas, radical liberal and plebeian nationalism
were constantly intersecting, their respective proponents discussing and debating, forging a
common program.
Both radical liberal and plebeian nationalism were driving forces in a general democratic
spring occurring in post-colonial Latin America, centering around the year 1848. Traditional
hierarchies, the exclusion of the poor from politics, and social injustices were all challenged by
rising liberal opposition to the conservative post-independence turn. The series of events that
played out in Venezuela and Colombia at mid-century were monumental, as they saw political
and national communities expand to include plebeians, in practice and in law. This more
inclusive definition of nationhood was accompanied by the diminished influence of traditional
elites, for a time. This democratic spring would contribute to the creation of what James Sanders
calls “American Republican Modernity,” a general feeling among Latin American liberal
intellectuals and peoples that their region was at the vanguard of world progress and
democracy.131 This study of the ideologies that motivated radical liberals further reveals that
“American Republican Modernity,” drew not only from a sense of political progress, but from
the idea that Latin America’s republics were finally becoming nations as well.
Not surprising then, is the strong feeling of Pan-Latin Americanism that characterizes the
thought of Latin America’s radical liberal nationalists. As noted earlier, Mercado envisaged the
social revolution he set out to achieve in Colombia as part of a wider Pan-Latin American effort
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to reform society. Further, he had been inspired in this vision by his attention to political events
across the region, such as the Ecuadorian revolution. This spirit was also evident in López’s
1853 speech, as he referenced Colombia’s neighbors as sister republics and celebrated the defeat
of Juan Manuel de Rosas, “the dictator” in Argentina that same year.132 The idea of a midcentury democratic spring in Latin America is thus not merely the retrospective formulation of
historians. Plebeians and radicals living through that time perceived it as such. Indeed, it is no
accident that it would be during this period that Chilean liberal writer Francisco Bilbao would
popularize the phrase “Latin America.” While Bilbao had developed the idea in response to the
William Walker expedition in Nicaragua, it drew on the general feelings of democratic progress
and advancing nationalism that characterized this new, revolutionary era.133
Juan Álvarez and La Reforma
The flowering of a democratic spring in Mexico was complicated by the North American
invasion in 1846. Before the war had broken out, peasants along Mexico’s southern coasts had
been engaged in a series of revolts against the conservative, centralist authorities that dominated
Mexico City. In 1845, a coup brought the conservative centralist Mariano Paredes to power.
Liberals were outraged by the events, some even suspecting Paredes (not without reason) of
monarchist sympathies. In April 1846, liberal leaders in the south called for a revolt against the
new regime.134 In their proclamations, the revolting peasants were already adopting plebeian
nationalist rhetoric. The residents of Tlapa declared “Federation or death. Long live America:
and death forever to tyranny. The whites, the blacks, and we the Indians, we are all Mexicans,”
before going on to emphasize that their revolt was not “a caste war,” but a protest against high
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taxes and tyranny.135 Mexican plebeians thus combined nationalist rhetoric with a defense of
their autonomy and livelihoods, highlighting the same social aspects of the nation that were
highlighted in Colombia. Plebeians asserted that they were equal and patriotic members of the
nation, and that this entitled them to protection from economic exploitation.
The peasant revolt was led by the veteran liberal and federalist politician Juan Álvarez.
Born into a middle-class mestizo family, Álvarez had participated in every major popular
insurrection since the Grito de Dolores in 1810, losing both his legs in the Wars of
Independence. After the murder of federalist leader Vicente Guerrero in 1831, Álvarez’s talent at
organizing the indigenous communities of the Pacific coast to resist the centralist turn in
government made him the de facto leader of federalism in the region.136 This federalist-centralist
divide, as identified by historian Peter Guardino, is similar to that which would later emerge in
Venezuela and Colombia. Under leaders like Guerrero and Álvarez, federalism came to mean
increased economic and political autonomy for plebeians and their communities, alongside lower
taxes. Further, just as would be the case in Venezuela and Colombia a decade later, federalists
constructed their ideology in opposition to the Mexico City based elite, which was “identified
with the continuation of Spanish colonialism.”137 Thus, many of the political and ideological
developments that would characterize the democratic spring of the 1840s and 50s would be
pioneered in Mexico across the 1820s and 30s. In his relations with indigenous communities,
Álvarez would become one of the first mediators, incorporating plebeians into a popular
federalist condition ideologically similar to the movements constructed by radical liberal
nationalists like Mercado and Zamora in the next decade.
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The peasant rebellions of 1846 successfully drove Paredes from power and forced a
return to federalism. However, the United States’ invasion later that year forced a national
rapprochement between centralists and federalists and the postponement of plebeian’s demands
for autonomy. Regardless, the rivalry between the two factions continued to manifest itself in
disputes over military strategy. While federalists like Álvarez advocated arming peasants en
masse and waging a national guerrilla war, centralists like Santa Anna were disturbed by the
potential challenge to the social order such a strategy could pose.138 However, as the North
Americans began to seize major Mexican cities, communities and local leaders began to take
matter into their own hands. In Huatusco, a national appeal was published in response to General
Scott’s call for surrender, declaring “The Mexican nation, justly indignant, responds with us war
before dishonor: death before disgrace… Reduced to our natural resources of defense, we will
adopt in this struggle the system of guerrillas.” (emphasis original)139 This popular appeal relies
on the same spirit of nationalism as the proclamation of Tlapa a year earlier, calling on plebeians
to rise up in the defense of the patria. Further, the reference to “natural resources of defense,”
emphasizes the continuity between the peasant revolts that preceded the war and the resistance to
foreign aggression. In advocating guerrilla war, radical liberals hoped to harness the force of
plebeian nationalism to win the war.
Resistance to the North American invasion drew on powerful reservoirs of popular
nationalism. One popular song from the Pacific Coast during the war, El padre nuestro de los
yankees, que rezan los mejicanos, declared that plebeian soldiers were heroes of the patria,
whose blood sanctified the nation. However, these appeals carried strong overtones of social
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conflict as well. Later verses in the song said of the North Americans that “They would put taxes
on us with the greatest tyranny,” and that “They would take from us our bread.”140 The North
American invaders were identified not just as foreign aggressors, but as social oppressors that
sought to limit plebeian’s autonomy. In particular, the focus on taxation reveals how peasants
saw the war against the US as a continuation of their revolts against the oligarchy. For plebeians,
national liberation meant not just the expulsion of the North American’s but also the
dismantlement of social oppression. While the intercession of war may have resulted in a
tenuous alliance between centralist and federalist leaders, for the ordinary soldiers it was another
reflection of the struggle against the social order.
Conflict between plebeian soldiers and their elite leaders intensified as the fortunes of
war increasingly declined. Radicals in San Luis Potosí called for the confiscation of private
wealth to support the war effort, condemning the wealthy for their lack of patriotism. When they
discovered the government’s plans to make peace, they even mounted an abortive revolt. Other
liberal leaders, such as Álvarez, opposed such moves, as they felt they undermined the national
unity necessary to prosecute the war.141 However, events were moving too quickly to be
controlled. While plebeian soldiers broadly adhered to Álvarez’s calls for unity, social conflict
continued. When peasants in the south seized hacienda lands during the war, the National Guards
refused to stop them. In other regions, National Guards, militias hastily organized to fight the
North Americans, even participated in land seizures!142 The National Guard, as a natural
evolution of the earlier popular mobilizations across the south, carried a distinctly plebeian
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character. Despite the efforts of their leaders, the stamp that those earlier revolts had left on the
soldiers’ political consciousnesses could not be fully removed, as they repeatedly used their
positions to attack elite power and wealth. This, however, does not constitute a rejection of the
nation on the part of plebeians. Rather, plebeians contended that the domestic oligarchy, which
had undermined feelings of national fraternity by exploiting the poor, was no less hostile to the
nation than the North Americans.
After the war ended in 1848, the continuing threat of plebeian radicalism forced the
weakened national government to make concessions to the peasants and radical liberals of the
south. Álvarez took advantage of the moment to press the long-standing federalist demand that a
new state, Guerrero, be formed along the south coast. Forming a coalition with indigenous
communities and the veterans of the peasant revolts and North American invasion, Álvarez
gained the necessary popular support to form the new state in 1849. The new state legislature
quickly passed laws responding to a litany of plebeian complaints, lowering taxes and
establishing universal male suffrage. Further, in recognition of plebian nationalism, the state
constitution recognized the right of “acción popular” against traitors to the republic.143 The more
democratic environment in the new state allowed even more radical ideas to begin entering the
political sphere. In 1851, an unnamed individual entered the state and began arguing for a “social
and political constitution,” and other ideas collectively labeled “socialism” by the local paper.144
As occurred in Colombia and Venezuela, the democratizing political atmosphere of the 1840s
brought the social demands of plebeians to the fore. These social demands met a receptive
audience of radical liberals who hoped for social reform, or even revolution.
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This democratic opening was brought to a crashing end in 1852, as a conservative
rebellion broke out that returned Santa Anna to power. Like the old centralists, the conservatives
hoped to strengthen the power of the central government and end federalism once and for all.
They also hoped to limit popular political participation once more and reinstate the hated pre-war
taxes. Even more disturbing to plebeians and radicals alike, the new conservative movement
carried a distinct monarchist tinge. Santa Anna was referred to as “His Serene Highness,” and the
government elevated Iturbide over Hidalgo and Guerrero as the true hero of independence. The
sudden whirlwind of reaction, however, would fail to fundamentally alter the base of Mexican
society. For decades, plebeians had engaged in politics by forming alliances with mediators like
Álvarez. Furthermore, they had carried arms in defense of their nation both in popular revolts
against the oligarchy and against foreign invasions, and in so doing had come to view themselves
as patriots. While the conservatives could take from plebeians their legal place in the nation, they
could not take from them their lived experiences as ciudadanos. Thus, rather than reordering
society, the conservatives solely managed to provoke another uprising against, in Álvarez’s
words, the “privileged classes… which feed on their [the people’s] blood.”145
Determined to reclaim their rights, plebeians and radical liberals in Guerrero joined
together and issued the Plan of Ayutla in 1854. The plan harshly condemned the monarchist
pretensions and autocratic centralism of the Santa Anna regime, while demanding the nation be
reconstituted as “a popular representative republic.” In other documents distributed by the rebels,
the conservatives were denounced for their “oligarchic” character, and argued the rebellion was a
defense of “independence.” The rhetoric of the Ayutla revolutionaries, though separated in space
and time from their counterparts in Venezuela and Colombia, was remarkably similar. The
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popular federalists fought to unseat the post-colonial oligarchy, which suffocated the nation
through repression and exclusion. Equally, they conceived of the struggle as a continuation of the
Wars of Independence, and their promise of an inclusive nation-state. Álvarez made this
nationalist appeal explicit, declaring that the revolution would make “the division between
brothers disappear.”146 The intersection between plebeian and radical liberal nationalisms made
the Ayutla Revolution possible, providing and ideology based around an inclusive and popular
conception of both the nation and democracy, and the promise of social reform. This fusion of
the two nationalisms was achieved by the mediator, Álvarez, who performed the quotidian work
to organize a broad coalition, negotiating between the demands of popular sectors and the
exigencies of the national situation, forging a common program. Across the Americas, it was
these nationalist coalitions that were fundamentally reshaping the post-colonial order.
One of the unique aspects about Mexican nationalism in this period, and in Latin America
in general, was that it relied as much on ideas of the future as the past. Of course, as has been
noted above, both radical liberal and plebeian nationalisms relied on popular conceptions of a
history of shared struggle against oppression going back to the Wars of Independence. Equally,
nationalist appeals often relied on a heroic memory of the triumphs of independence and its
protagonists. However, even as plebeians and radicals both celebrated the heroism of Hidalgo or
Bolívar, there was always a critical undercurrent, as they observed that popular aspirations for
autonomy and inclusion were not achieved after independence. Thus, the Wars of Independence
were not seen as a glorious past to return to, but rather as a broken promise. In answer to the
popular feeling that the Wars of Independence had been left unfinished, new nationalist
movements, centered around mediators, arose to take up the fallen banner. The new movements

146

Ibid., 184-85.

Riley 69

created spaces where intellectuals and plebeians could share their ideas for what the nation ought
to become and create plans for wide reaching political and social reform. This nationalism,
orientated towards the renovation of the nation, thus relied more than anything on plebeian’s and
radical’s ideas of what the future should bring, rather than any notion of the past. Predicting the
contradictions that independence would bring, Simón Bolívar had warned that “A great volcano
lies at our feet. Who shall restrain the oppressed classes?”147 By 1854, it was clear that no one
could.
Over the rest of 1854 and through 1855, the popular revolt, fought as a guerrilla war,
spread out from Guerrero across the rest of Mexico. By the summer of 1855, Santa Anna’s
support had evaporated, and the revolt of several military garrisons forced him into exile. After
political maneuvering within the rebel camp, it was decided that Álvarez would assume the
presidency. Later in the year, he entered into Mexico City in triumph, alongside his barefoot
plebeian soldiers. But, even at this hour of triumph, divisions began to emerge in the Federalist
leadership. Many elites within the coalition were disturbed at the sight of armed plebeians
occupying the capital. Indeed, as Guy Thomson notes, the Ayutla Revolution was “a victory for
the periphery over the center,” which took mediator-based politics and coalitions to the national
level. Some wealthy liberals even feared that Álvarez and his “barbarian” followers could ignite
a caste war.148 The fracturing of the triumphant Ayutla coalition provides one of the first clear
examples of the limitations of mediator politics. Radical liberal mediators could build powerful
revolutionary movements for political and social reform within their own regions, coming to
dominate local politics. However, at the level of the national party, their projects were always
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contested by their moderate (and more elite) colleagues who recoiled at the thought of social
revolution. As nationalist coalitions increasingly empowered plebeians, elites, conservative and
liberal alike, grew evermore disquieted at the rising revolutionary tide.
Amidst these divisions, Álvarez’s presidency would ultimately flounder. The press
constantly criticized him for his association with the indigenous and afro-descendant plebeians in
the south, and his radical views on social injustices. Even within his own cabinet, moderates and
radicals were constantly feuding, and challenging his capacity to govern. Eventually,
disillusioned by politics in the capital, Álvarez resigned in December of 1856 and returned to
Guerrero.149 However, Álvarez’s retreat from the national stage did not end the scrutiny of him
and his alliances with popular forces. In 1857, the Spaniard Bermejillo went before the Spanish
chargé d’affaires in Mexico to complain about Álvarez’s conduct as president. In particular, he
accused Álvarez of failing to respond to a series of attacks on Spanish owned haciendas in
Morelos. He further alleged that Álvarez’s own soldiers had participated in the attacks, having
been encouraged by his anti-Spanish rhetoric.150 In response, Álvarez published his “Manifesto
of Ciudadano Juan Álvarez: To the cultured peoples of Europe and America,” in the hope of
fulfilling his duty to “my patria, my dignity, and my conscience.”151
The manifesto, though framed as a defense of Álvarez’s conduct, provides a clear
example of radical liberal nationalist rhetoric, and its analysis of the problems facing
postcolonial Latin America. In Álvarez’s view, the crisis facing Mexico was not plebeian
discontent, but a corrupt social order that produced “the misery that devours the peoples of

149

Ibid., 189.
Juan Álvarez, Manifiesto del ciudadano Juan Álvarez: A los pueblos cultos de Europa y América (1857), 304306.
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Guerrero, destroyed by the devastating hand of the tyrant.” This misery was provoked by “the
enemies of liberty,” those who wanted “to enslave again the people.” Álvarez identified the
oppression of plebeians by elites as the barrier to stable nationhood and democracy. In his view,
hostile elites and their unceasing attempts to maintain their power and wealth had repeatedly
threatened “public order.” In contrast, his “movement of five-thousand southerners” had served
“to sustain the administration of Ayutla, combatting tyranny and its proselytes.” Similar to
Mercado and Zamora, Álvarez argued that while elites undermined popular governments in the
name of “order,” plebeians had proved themselves the true defenders of the nation by repeatedly
rallying to its defense. In doing so, plebeians had proved themselves the true heirs of the
democratic and nationalist spirit of independence. As Álvarez reproached those who criticized
the class composition of his movement, “I have arrived here, to be with the loyal forces… that
support the present administration, emanation of the regenerating plan of Ayutla.” 152
Álvarez’s opposition to elite efforts at social control was linked to his belief that the
hierarchies and institutions of Spanish colonialism still held sway over much of Mexico.
Álvarez, denying that his soldiers had participated in the attacks on the haciendas, argued that
their “true crime… is that they defended liberty: they tried to defeat that kind of feudalism,
established by Bermejillo and other Spaniards… the center of the crimes and evils are the same
haciendas, almost in their totality.”153 Álvarez thus identified the root cause of violence and
instability as the country side as the persistence of colonial feudalism. In Morelos, Spanish
hacendados continued to dominate economic and political life decades after independence,
leading to what Álvarez saw as inevitable social conflict. Further, Álvarez condemned how the
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Spanish hacendados in Morelos interfered in national politics. Bermejillo and other hacendados
had “mixed themselves in the politics of the country… they continued to be the disturbers of the
public peace…” provoking popular anger against them.154 The persistence of Spanish influence
over the country tainted economic and political life, especially as it attempted to prop up
conservative resistance to programs of nationalist reform.
Álvarez saw the conflict between Spaniards and Mexicans in Morelos as part of a larger
historic struggle between the aspiring nation and a tyrannical empire. As he declared, “What do
the Spaniards bring when they come to the New World? Where do they work their fortunes to
enjoy in their native land?... we are the offended.”155 Bermejillo and his fellow hacendados were
part of the long stream of Spaniards, who had, since Cortés, exploited Mexico’s people and
resources for their own benefit. Considering this, Álvarez could understand and defend the anger
that drove peasants’ attacks on the Spanish hacendados, crying “that the peoples raise their voice
and their clamors against the properties of the Spaniards in their majority, it is because they
usurp their lands and exercise a feudalism as or crueler than that enthroned in the times of royal
life.” Across Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico, the perception of the lingering pernicious
influence of Spanish colonialism was a key element of both radical liberal and plebeian
nationalism. However, in Mexico, the continued existence of a significant and visible class of
Spanish hacendados in the country gave plebeians and radicals a clear target for their anger,
justified or not, intensifying the anti-colonial aspects of nationalism. This powerful anticolonialism drove social radicalism, as plebeians attacked Spanish haciendas, and radicals
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argued it was the fault of the Spanish for oppressing their workers. Social revolution was seen as
necessary to bring the colonial exploitation of Mexico to a final end.
While the Spanish hacendados were the particular target of Álvarez’s anger, he also
criticized haciendas as inherently oppressive institutions. Commenting on the haciendas in
Morelos, Álvarez stated that “The hacendados, their majority… trade and enrich with the
miserable sweat of the unhappy worker: they bind them like slaves.” Álvarez saw a relationship
of class exploitation between hacendados and their workers, as the masters used debt and other
coercive measures to trap workers on the hacienda. Having trapped their workforce, hacendados
them exploited the peasants mercilessly, enriching themselves while leaving the workers in
grinding poverty. Furthermore, Álvarez noted how the hacendados’ constant desire to expand
their haciendas victimized indigenous communities and small farmers. “Some hacendados…
slowly take possession, now of the lands of individuals, now of the ejidos and those of the
community… without presenting a legal title.” 156 Worsening the situation, the political influence
of the hacendados ensured that “persecution and incarceration is what is given as a prize to those
who reclaim what is theirs.”157 Álvarez identified that the impositions of the land-holding class
on the peasantry naturally resulted in resistance and social conflict. His obvious sympathy for the
peasantry in this struggle, even for radical actions like land reclamations, demonstrates once
again the powerful strain of social radicalism that permeated radical liberal nationalism in
Mexico.
At the core of both radical liberals and plebeian nationalists’ cries for social change was
the demand for autonomy. Indeed, it is notable that Álvarez, Mercado, and Zamora were all
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passionate federalists. Federalism, at its core, was an ideology of opposition to centralized state
power, in favor of empowering local communities to decide their own fates. Federalism also had
an inclusive view of citizenship, which hoped to expand the limits of suffrage to include all men
(though not women). Further, for the most radical federalists, it also entailed the defense of the
poor not just against state impositions, but exploitation by wealthy hacendados as well. These
radicals recognized that as long as the masses were economically subjugated by the oligarchy,
any attempt at expanding political freedoms would be smothered within the confines of the
haciendas. Radical liberals’ hope for social change dovetailed with plebeians’ understandings of
autonomy. Ever since national independence, plebeians had seen their personal independence
eroded, as the haciendas usurped their lands and prohibited them from accessing common
resources, forcing them to choose between starvation or submission. Equally, conservative
governments had forced heavy taxes upon them, while simultaneously denying them the rights of
citizenship. Facing this assault on their rights, plebeians across Latin America joined political
movements in the hope that they could recuperate their lands and win new political rights. The
radical liberal and plebeian nationalist coalitions coalesced around the demand of autonomy.
However, Álvarez’s retreat from the national scene ensured that these radical projects for
autonomy would remain a parochial force in politics, in a tenuous alliance with the liberal
reformers now coming to power in Mexico City. The accession of the moderate liberal Ignacio
Comonfort to the presidency after Álvarez’s resignation marked the beginning of La Reforma
(The Reform). Seen today as the foundation of the modern Mexican nation-state, La Reforma
saw the implementation of a series of top-down reforms which liberals hoped would end the
colonial corporatist order of society. The Ley Juárez abolished the legal corporate fueros (rights),
that entitled the church and military to separate courts and legal privileges. Meanwhile, the Ley

Riley 75

Lerdo abolished corporate ownership of the land. While the law targeted the church’s significant
holdings in Mexico, it also targeted the village lands and ejidos of indigenous peoples. Thus,
while La Reforma did strike at the power of the conservative oligarchy, it did little, and in some
ways further compromised, the autonomy of plebeians. It was during this elitist turn in
government that elections would be held for a congress to draft a new constitution for Mexico.158
However, as Peter Guardino notes, the ultimate transformation of La Reforma into a
liberal and centralist project “was not by any means a foregone conclusion.” Radical liberals and
federalists fought for their vision of the nation to be represented in its fundamental law.159 In one
speech to the congress, radical lawyer and writer Ignacio Ramírez criticized those who saw the
Mexican nation as homogenous, “the mixed race extends itself across all parts, and we will find a
hundred nations that in vain we will try today to mix into one.” Ramírez, while a nationalist,
recognized that indigenous peoples had long preserved their “nationality independent and
glorious,” against oppression and exploitation. Indigenous peoples had even preserved their
languages, “that the Bishop Zumárraga could not burn, nor the sword of the conquistador
destroy.” Considering the indigenous people’s centuries-long struggle for autonomy, Ramírez
argued that they could only be incorporated into the nation on the basis of respect for their
traditions and cultures. “Do you want to form a stable division of national territory…? Elevate
the indigenous to the sphere of ciudadanos… but begin to divide them by languages.”160
Contrary to the more common strains of nationalism of the time, which sought to elevate national
identity over any communal or ethnic association, Ramírez took a federalist approach to the
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nation. In his view, increasing indigenous communities’ autonomy, while simultaneously
elevating them to full citizenship, would do more to win their patriotic commitment than any
effort at coercive homogenization.
Ramírez also appealed for the rights of workers to be respected by the constitution. Like
many radicals, he condemned haciendas as representing “the feudalism of the middle ages…”
noting how “chains bound him [the worker] to the soil.” However, Ramírez went further, as he
tied the hierarchical and exploitative structure of the hacienda to the conditions of the nascent
urban working class. Just as the peon had been exploited over the ages by the aristocracy, “today
one finds the slave of capital… today the worker is the cane one squeezes and abandons.”
Observing the landscape of the incipient industrial age, he declared that “the great, the true social
problem, is to emancipate the laborers from the capitalists.” Since it was the workers who
produced the profit for capitalists, Ramírez argued they were entitled to a share of it, a principle
he called “socialism.” This redistribution of wealth was necessary to allow workers to gain
financial stability, educate their families, and “to exercise the rights of a ciudadano.”161 While
utopian in nature, Ramírez’s critique of emerging industrial capitalism placed him at the most
radical edge of contemporary liberal thought in Latin America. His analysis of the oppressive
class relationship between worker and boss is intertwined with an argument that a lack of
economic autonomy erodes an individual’s political rights. Capitalism, and the social hierarchies
it produced, were thus seen as a threat to democratic nationhood, to be combatted through
egalitarian social reforms.
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Following Ramírez’s speech, José María Castillo Velasco rose to speak for the rights of
municipalities. While stating his agreement with the social reforms proposed by Ramírez,
Castillo felt that the delegates had largely failed to address the demands of communities for
political autonomy. Ever since their establishment with the adoption of the Cádiz Constitution as
part of the Three Guarantees, self-governing municipalities had provided Mexican plebeians the
opportunity to participate directly in the government of their communities, allowing them to
exercise the rights of ciudadanos. Municipalities further offered plebeians a “link to the idea and
praxis of the nation-state.” However, many deputies at the 1856 congress were advocating a
return to the 1824 constitution, which had limited the number and powers of municipalities.162
As Castillo pointed out in a later speech defending the right of the Federal District to form a
municipality, limitations on the autonomy of communities and municipalities were contrary to
federalism. Though the district wanted “to elects its own authorities…” and “the liberty of
municipal power,” it had long suffered under the “tyrannical and despotic” direct rule of the
central government.163 Municipalities thus represented radical liberals longstanding commitment
to the democratization of politics at the local level. Further, this democratization was deeply tied
with projects of social reform, another deputy commenting on Castillo’s “desire to give lands to
the Indians.”164 Radical liberals, who had long fought the centralizing, conservative state under
the banner of the popular will, hoped to strengthen the nation through expanding communal,
rather than state, power.
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Logically then, radicals argued that popular action rather than strict constitutional
delineations would provide the strongest defense against potential abuses of state power. While
discussing the “Rights of Man” enumerated by the constitution, one deputy argued that the duty
of citizens to defend the constitution should not be included. The deputy was concerned that,
since the constitution did not specify “the means that subaltern authorities should adopt for this
defense, as such resistance is extremely dangerous.” Ponciano Arriaga, one of the leaders of
resistance to the North Americans in San Luis Potosi, responded “where there is passive
obedience, liberty ends.” In keeping with radical liberalism’s belief in the patriotic commitment
of plebeians, Arriaga exclaimed “Hopefully… all the citizens rise up like a single man believing
that an attack on the guarantees of an individual is an attack on the whole society!”165 Rather
than seeing the relationship between state and citizen as top-down and hierarchical, radicals
argued that citizens had a right, even duty, to oppose an oppressive government. The ciudadanos,
rather than the legislature or army, were the ultimate source of the state’s legitimacy, and the true
caretakers of the constitutional order. Radical notions of republicanism were thus heavily
influence by notions of direct democracy, emphasizing that ultimately the republic could only be
sustained by the dedication of the masses.
Ignacio Ramírez rose next, to criticize the constitution for only speaking of the “rights of
man.” The constitution “forgets the social rights of the woman… it does not think on her
emancipation nor give her political functions… in matrimony the woman is equal to the man and
has rights to demand that the law should assure her.” While short of calling for women’s
suffrage, Ramírez’s assertion of women’s fundamental equality is among the most radical
declarations of the congress. Ramírez’s belief in expanding women’s rights was tied to his

165

Ibid., 248-9.

Riley 79

perception of the relationship between social and political ill. “Before thinking on the
organization of public powers, one must attend to the good order of the family… the case is that
many unfortunates are beaten by their husbands. This is so shameful in a civilized people…” A
parallel is drawn between the despotic rule of an abusive husband over his house, and the
impositions of a tyrant over the nation. The expansion of women’s political and social rights thus
was framed as necessary for the preservation of democracy. Equally, Ramírez argued for “the
rights of the children, the orphans, the natural children… some ancient codes lasted for centuries
because they protected… all the weak and needy, and it is necessary that today constitutions
have the same objective.”166 While paternalistic in nature, Ramírez had proposed a radical series
of social rights meant to erode all forms of oppression in society, whether based on gender or
social position. It was only through these expanded social rights that political liberty for all could
finally be realized.
Throughout the course of the congress, radical liberals and federalists proposed a new
vision for the Mexican nation. The expansive project of reform they proposed encompassed
women’s rights, indigenous peoples’ autonomy, land reform, labor rights, and municipal selfgovernment. More than a political project, these reforms constituted a bottom-up approach to
nation construction, in opposition to traditional state driven nation-building. Rather than using
the rewards and punishments the state could offer to coerce plebeians into loyalty to the national
project, radicals sought instead to meet their long-standing demands for autonomy. The basis for
the nation was not expanded state power, but the political force of plebeian nationalism, which
had provided the motivating force for the Revolution of Ayutla and the initiation of La Reforma
in the first place. This form of nation-building was thus a manifestation of mediator politics on
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the national level, as it drew on the programs and organizations that had been developed by the
radical liberal-plebeian coalitions during the revolts of the preceding decades. While this vision
for the nation would ultimately not triumph at the constitutional congress, it would be the vision
that would motivate plebeian resistance during the tumultuous decade to come. Ignacio Ramírez
summarized this hope most aptly, arguing “The Mexican nation cannot organize itself with
elements of the old political science, for they are the expression of slavery and worry… let us
form a constitution founded upon the privilege of the needy, of the ignorant, of the weak…”167
These principles would not come to be the basis of the new constitution, as they met
increasing opposition from moderate liberals and conservatives at the congress. Landowners
issued pamphlets and gave speeches against the radicals, criticizing them for what they perceived
as an assault on property rights.168 Ultimately the more powerful landowners won out in the
debates, and the constitution would shed most radical influence, though it would establish
universal male suffrage.169 Regardless of its comparatively moderate character, the constitution
enraged conservatives. In 1857 the conservatives, hoping to preserve the corporate system, led a
coup against the moderate Comonfort presidency, initiating a civil war between the two parties,
the War of the Reform. Benito Juárez, the President of the Supreme Court, ascended to the
Presidency and led the liberals to victory by 1860. However, in 1861, at the invitation of the
Conservatives and using Juárez government’s suspension of payment of foreign debts as a
justification, Napoleon III of France convinced Britain and Spain to join him in an invasion of
Mexico. However, by 1862, the British and Spanish, realizing that France had designs to conquer
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all Mexico and impose a monarchy, withdrew. Faced with the prospect of imperial conquest,
Mexican radicals and plebeians resolved to fight a war of national liberation.
The radical newspaper, La Chinaca (The Plebe), began publishing during this critical
period. Its pages, besides being filled with radical liberal and plebeian nationalist rhetoric,
provide a window into how plebeians engaged with and understood their nation. For example, as
James Sanders notes, the paper’s initial masthead depicts a group of men, women, and children
in peasant dress gathered around a man reading a newspaper aloud, demonstrating how even the
illiterate excitedly engaged with politics.170 A later masthead depicts a peasant, clutching a
newspaper, giving a speech to a small crowd gathered around him, which watches with rapt
attention.171 The image shows the political agency of plebeians, as they gathered in small groups
and clubs, discussing the news and hearing speeches. The masthead evolved further the
following year. On the left side of the image, plebeians gather to hear a newspaper read aloud, as
they had in the previous mastheads. But at the center, an excited crowd of soldiers and civilians
gathers around a man in middle-class dress, a mediator, speaking impassionedly, perhaps relating
recent military victories.172 The evolving mastheads of La Chinaca effectively demonstrate the
quotidian methods of nation-building that characterized mid-19th century Latin America.
Gatherings of plebeians in public spaces provided not just a platform for political activism, but a
place for ciudadanos of all backgrounds to gather to show their support for the national cause. It
was through these gatherings that plebeians articulated and experienced their notion of the
inclusive patria.

170

Sanders, The Vanguard of the Atlantic World, 14.
La Chinaca, August 14, 1862, 1.
172
La Chinaca, April 3, 1863, 1.
171

Riley 82

Figure 1: See footnote 170

Figure 2: See footnote 171
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Figure 3: See footnote 172

Besides its articles, La Chinaca also published patriotic poetry and songs, meant to
bolster popular enthusiasm in the war against the French. Among the poems that the paper
published was El Chinaco, a patriotic ode to the plebeian soldiers who fought the French. The
first verses describe how the plebeian, Juan, leaves his small village and loving mother, crossing
great distances to join the armies of the Republic. These sacrifices were necessary, as “for the
patria, he is going to fight.” Though he risks death, “he will sleep/in the arms of his patria/like a
nuptial bed.”173 This short poem encapsulates radicals’ views on plebeians and their place in
their nation. Plebeians were romanticized as selfless defenders of the nation, who despite having
little, gave everything in the service of the national cause. The valorization of the plebeian, a
common trope of radical liberal nationalism, was a product of mediator politics. Radicals, having
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long worked alongside plebeians to forge political movements and mount revolts in the name of
the nation, saw their heroism and sacrifice first hand. Over time, this image of the patriotic
plebeian, in arms to defend his patria, became the representative of the revolutionary nation in its
struggle against tyranny and imperialism.
The poetry and articles of La Chinaca were further imbued with ideas of pan-Latin
Americanism and democratic progress. The poem Cancion de Guerra [sic], War Song, relates
how “The genius of Europe/With a vandal troop/nears the city/… Holy liberty/ Defends the new
world.”174 France’s intervention was seen not just as an attack on Mexico, but an attack on all the
Americas. The conflict was thus a confrontation between the democratic forces of Latin
America, defended by liberty, and the despotic armies of European imperialism. Further, the
term “new world,” took on a new meaning. Rather than signifying the European discovery of the
Americas, the “new world” signified the vitality and democracy of Latin America’s republics,
while the aged monarchies of Europe desperately hoped to crush. As another poem, ¡¡Alerta!!,
warned “The tyrants defame/The world of Columbus/The mud of their thrones/Soaks our
fronts/With torrential blood/One will erase the stain.”175 Under the threat of foreign invasion,
Mexicans saw themselves as defending not only their own nation, but all of Latin America.
Analyses of the transatlantic “Age of Revolutions” generally assume that the victory of
Latin American independence marked the end of any transatlantic revolutionary experience. In
reality however, Latin Americans continued to perceive their revolutionary experience as tied to
the European well into the 1860s. In an article entitled Italia y Mexico [sic], the author felt that
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“What happened at the beginning of 1848 seems that it is going to repeat itself at the end of
1862…” The author continued on, arguing that the conflict between the Italian Revolutionaries,
led by Garibaldi, and Victor Emmanuelle II, would inevitably draw France into Italy. Mexico
should thus support Garibaldi, as “the cause of Italy is identified in the cause of Mexico. – Let
Garibaldi march on Rome and Louis Napoleon will tremble on his throne.”176 The respective
struggles for nationhood of Mexico and Italy were thus conceptualized as related in both nature
and outcome. The Revolutions of 1848, themselves playing out on both sides of the Atlantic, had
helped rekindle what James Sanders calls “The Atlantic Imagination,” the idea of Latin
American revolutionaries fighting alongside their European counterparts for the revindication of
democracy.177 In the minds of revolutionaries, if not of historians “The Age of Revolutions”
extended long after Ayacucho.
Though it would be several years before the French were finally defeated in Mexico, the
nation had already been fundamentally transformed politically and socially. While Mexico had
not experienced a general democratic opening in 1848 as had Venezuela and Colombia, it had
been the theater of almost unbroken social struggle and contestation. Since the peasants of
Guerrero and Juan Álvarez rose up in 1846 against Mariano Paredes, they had fought both
foreign invasions and centralist elites in an effort to reshape the Mexican nation. This process
culminated the Revolution of Ayutla, and the drafting of a new constitution. While ultimately
over the course of the constitutional congress, it would be the liberal centralists who would
triumph in promulgating their vision of Mexico’s future, plebeian and radical liberal nationalism
would remain active at the margins of the Mexican state. Peter Guardino argued that the

176

"Mexico y Italia." [sic] La Chinaca, September 30, 1862, 2.

177

Sanders, The Vanguard of the Atlantic World, 136.

Riley 86

intervention of Mexico’s plebeians into La Reforma was critical in reshaping the Mexican state,
that “Mexico’s peasantry had refused to be excluded from the polity and in doing so had changed
Mexican history.”178 However, perhaps plebeians most enduring contribution is not the effect
they had on the Mexican state, but that they helped shape a revolutionary conception of the
Mexican nation, which challenged the state to break with the legacies of colonialism, and forge a
new order based on autonomy and equality.
This revolutionary vision of the nation is, in many ways, unique to Latin America. While
at the beginning of this study the influence of the revolutionary ideology of the French Jacobins
over Latin America was noted, it is vital to recognize the difference between the two Jacobin
traditions. France’s Jacobins were firm centralists, who sought to concentrate all power in Paris
and the Convention. Indeed, the Jacobins brutally crushed the Federalists when they revolted in
1793. Zamora, Mercado, and Álvarez, on the other hand, all were or would become Federalists.
The divergence between the two traditions has at its core Latin America’s unique historical
situation. Ever since the Wars of Independence, Latin American radicals had fought against
concentrated power, whether in the hands of a Viceroy, or in the hands of the post-independence
oligarchy. In this fight, as they increasingly drew closer to plebeians and learned from their
conceptions of the nation, the radicals became convinced that their goals could not be achieved
by expanding state power, but by limiting it in order to allow the nation to be constructed from
the bottom-up. Federalism thus became more than just a way of organizing the state, it
represented a rejection of social injustice and political elitism, and a belief in the right of the
masses to decide their own fates.
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Ultimately, while La Reforma may have established the basis of the modern Mexican
state, its legacy for the Mexican nation is far more complex. By the end of the civil and
international wars of the 1850s and 60s, Juárez and his coterie of elite liberals were firmly
ensconced in power, along with their vision of a powerful central state, presaging the Porfiriatio.
This vision had little place in it for the socially and politically radical projects of plebeians and
their mediator allies. At the same time, the victory of La Reforma, and indeed its very initiation
in Ayutla, had been entirely underwritten by the blood, sacrifice, and effort of those same
plebeians and mediators who had fought for an opposed concept of the nation. Though
federalism and popular nationalisms were banished to the margins of the state, they survived
even through the Porfiriato where they continued to champion popular rights against
encroaching state power.179 The ultimate result of La Reforma then, is that state and nation were
perhaps permanently divorced from one another, the state becoming the enemy of plebeians, the
nation a symbol of hope for the eventual reclamation of their rights.
Conclusion: Nations, States, and Popular Rights
The journey from independence to nationhood for Latin America was a tumultuous one.
The outburst of popular hope and aspirations that followed the downfall of three centuries of
Spanish colonialism soon was overtaken by the conservative post-independence turn of the
1830s. However, even as the state grew more authoritarian and centralist in character, at the
edges of its power plebeians and radicals continued to organize to redeem their vision of
independence for all. In Venezuela, Ezequiel Zamora and his llanero allies rose up against the
conservative oligarchy, challenging its restrictive notions of citizenship, setting in motion a chain
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of events that would ultimately end conservative rule in January 1848. In Colombia, the
accession of José Hilario López to the presidency in 1849 gave Ramón Mercado and other
revolutionaries the opportunity to advocate their own radical vision of the nation. In public
plazas and in the meetings of the Democratic Societies, plebeians and radicals worked together
to craft a vision of social and political revolution to free the exploited masses, and successfully
defended that vision against conservative revolt in 1851. All of these political projects shared a
core opposition to the persistence of colonial hierarchies after independence and a dedication to a
more inclusive nation.
In reaction to the conservative turn after independence, across Latin America two
ideologies of resistance arose: radical liberal and plebeian nationalism. It was these ideologies
that guided post-colonial liberal political movements. Plebeian nationalism, growing out of
popular participation in and understanding of the Wars of Independence, asserted plebeians’
political and social rights against the conservative “oligarchies” intent on usurping those rights.
Meanwhile, radical liberal nationalism theorized that the Spanish colonial social and political
orders had been preserved by the rise of the conservative “oligarchy,” which had prevented the
new republics from achieving nationhood. These two ideologies were brought together into
powerful political movements through the figures of the mediators. Zamora, Mercado, and
Álvarez, all from provincial and middle-class backgrounds, exemplified the role of mediators.
Through speeches, discussions, and proclamations, each man won the support of revolutionary
plebeians by condemning the exploitation of the poor by the wealthy, and by offering a vision of
social reform and expansive citizenship rights. As plebeians became increasingly important to
the survival of the radical liberal cause, they made their own influence felt on liberal projects, as
proposals for social reform escalated into cries of social revolution. Mediator politics, and the
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revolutionary nationalism that drove them, thus proved a powerful challenge to Latin America’s
post-colonial status quo.
Mediator politics, with its emphasis on principles local autonomy and social rights, thus
constituted a uniquely Latin American form of nation-building. The political coalitions that
formed between middle-class radicals and plebeians proved to be vehicles for revolutionary
projects that sought to restructure post-colonial society to be more equal, creating a stronger
sense of popular nationhood. Aside from their political goals, as the coalitions members faced
the challenges of elections, revolutions, and civil wars, they were increasingly drawn together by
feelings of shared struggle, creating a powerful feeling of national fraternity. While none of these
coalitions ever achieved lasting national political power, they were able to reshape their own
regions, and transferred their beliefs in the redemptive power of nationalism to plebeians across
the nation. The uniqueness of this form of nation-building thus lies in its reliance on the initiative
and organization of provincial actors and communities, rather than force of state power. Indeed,
the nation was often constructed in direct opposition to the state, as plebeians’ nationalism were
used to justify revolt against the central government. The revolutionary Latin American nation
thus came to represent the revolt of the village plaza against the national palace.
Latin America’s postcolonial revolutionary experience formed a part of a broader transAtlantic era of revolutions. The participants of the January Revolution in Venezuela and the
electoral campaign of José Hilario López in Colombia saw their political movements as linked to
the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe. Just as 1848 was seen as “the springtime of nations” in
Europe, Latin Americans saw their own primavera de los pueblos unfold across that tumultuous
year. This democratizing wave would extend into the 1850s and 60s, as the Revolution of Ayutla
and the subsequent conflicts saw the ultimate triumph of Mexico’s liberals over the
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conservatives. However, even as Latin American radicals acknowledged the inspiration they
found in the European revolutionary experience, their ideologies maintained a distinctly Latin
American character. Rather than simply transplant European notions of liberalism and to the
Americas, Latin Americans developed their own conceptions of democracy, based on broad
suffrage, respect for local autonomy, and expanded social rights for the poor. This vision of a
radical democracy was developed in direct response to the perceived persistence of colonial
hierarchies and oppressions after independence, rather than based upon European political
theory. The principles of democracy, plebeian nationalism, and social revolution established in
this era have left a deep imprint on the Latin American political consciousness and resurfaced in
the pivotal events of the 20th century, such as the Mexican Revolution.
The cries of Latin Americans’ for democratic and social revolution remain as stirring
today as they were in 1848. The radical visions of democracy that grew in the streets and
meeting halls of rural Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico throughout the 19th century bear little
relation to the exclusive and restrictive visions advocated by elites, then and now. The
democracy that plebeians and middle-class mediators built was a communal one. It was shaped
by the active participation of the poor in politics, as they asserted their demands for the rights of
ciudadanos. This organic, communal democracy, sprouting from the spontaneous genius of the
masses, gave birth to a federalist concept of the nation, where far-flung communities and
localities were bound together not by the centralized state but by a shared commitment to
upholding popular rights. These systems, of communal and federal democracy, distinctly Latin
American in character, constitute significant contributions to the development of democracy
across the world. Unfortunately, these contributions have long been obscured by the still
dominant stereotypes of Latin America as a land of caudillos and authoritarianism. Notions of
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what is “true” democracy are still largely derived from the European and North American
experiences. However now, as those state-centered models of democracy and nation seem to
descend into an ever-deepening crisis, it is more important than ever to revisit Latin America’s
revolutionary experience in the 19th century. Almost two centuries after Ramón Mercado issued
his cry for a social revolution to pave the way for a democracy that would truly be of the people,
his voice is still echoing. The peoples and nations of the world will respond in chorus, or not at
all.
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